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6Foreword
Effy Vayena
We live in revolutionary times! 
Whether you look at digitalization, 
genomics, or artificial intelligence, 
human life changes rapidly, potential-
ly dramatically: automated systems 
take over tasks that we are prepared 
to abandon, machines develop 
agency, genetic technologies edit our 
flaws. Our environment has changed. 
And the future seems to have arrived 
bearing yet another fundamental and 
deeper change on the very boundary 
between humans and technology. This 
boundary is shrinking as technolo-
gy amplifies human capabilities, 
augments our reality, fuses biologi-
cal and technological systems and 
stretches our world to dimensions that 
we have never experienced before. 
Klaus Schwab describes this current 
time as the 4th industrial revolution, 
with its main feature being the fusion 
of physical, digital and biological 
spheres. Another characteristic of 
this revolution is that it advances with 
an unprecedented speed; leaving us, 
humans, with little time to reflect upon 
what’s happening, on the changes 
that we undergo, on our trajectory 
and the future that these transforma-
tions will lead to. We are revolutiona-
ries who have not yet made sense of 
the revolution. 
What is partly responsible for 
this, is that our moral norms, the 
constitutional pieces of our humanity 
per se, are severely challenged by 
the ongoing revolutionary transfor-
mations. The very concept of human 
identity and the conditions that 
enable it to be formed, evolve and 
flourish are under pressure. The grid 
of values, on which we relied for our 
moral development as individuals 
and collectively, stands dusty next to 
the shiny cyber-physical systems of 
the fourth revolution. While there is 
no way to stop the revolution, there 
is clearly the most urgent need to 
reflect upon the transformations 
that are possible and their effect on 
human life. Examining our moral 
assumptions about the kind of society 
we want to live in and the kind of human 
life we want to be is as critical now 
as ever before in human history. We 
need a moral project that will help us 
navigate the fourth revolution without 
7losing the essential elements of our 
humanity. Moreover, a moral project 
which ensures that our technological 
capabilities will secure a better future 
for all humanity. This is a big task that 
requires a collective commitment. 
I am delighted that what comes 
in the next pages is conceived in 
this spirit. This book is a wonderful 
effort to make a contribution to the 
moral project: it is premised on 
three important tenets: first, the 
urgency and need to engage with 
ethical implications of the technolo-
gical possibilities. Reflecting on the 
ethical dimension of our technologi-
cal dreams and debating the current 
revolution cannot be an afterthought. 
Second, the realization that the 
complex issues we are facing need 
to be addressed from a variety of 
disciplines. No one has the monopoly 
on truth, especially in the current 
state of uncertainty and ambiguity 
about what this revolution means for 
humanity. Third, the debate about 
these issues should be one that 
everyone can participate. There is a 
lot of space for expert opinions, but 
there is also a huge need for clear 
communication of these challenges 
to anyone who is interested in the 
future of human life. That is all of us. 
And it is all of us who should take the 
future of human life seriously. 
8Introduction 
The Editorial team
Recent technological progresses 
have made technological modifica-
tions of human beings a real possibi-
lity. Some physical, cognitive and/
or psychological traits may soon be 
artificially radically enhanced. Such 
a scenario has already started. Just 
think how your smartphones have 
given you the power of geographical 
positioning and telepathy, through 
Global Positioning System (GPS) 
and Short Message Service (SMS) 
respectively. Many commentators 
have postulated that technological 
modification of human beings will 
become more and more common 
(Kurzweil, 2005). While some have 
postulated that it will be the only way 
for occidental citizen to be able to 
live in the fast changing technologi-
cal environment we are continuously 
creating (Harris, 2007; Powell and 
Buchanan, 2011), others have warned 
on the many socio-economical 
pressure that may compel individuals 
to continuously seek to be adapted 
for such an artificial environment 
(Menuz, 2015). This is an illustra-
tion of the many socio-ethical issues 
raised by human enhancement. Such 
issues have started to be seriously 
addressed by scholars around the 
world, as illustrated by Oxford and 
Cambridge Universities (UK) that have 
both created institutes dedicated to 
the many issues related to the use 
of modern technology for modifying 
individuals.1 However, while lay 
people may soon make technological 
choices in order to enhance them or 
their children, they have been largely 
overlooked in the debates, which 
have, for now, mainly been restricted 
to academics.That is quite paradoxi-
cal, because the many socio-ethical 
issues related by human enhance-
ment concern everybody living in our 
societies. 
We strongly believe that it is time 
for lay people to be implicated in the 
discussions. To do so, one of the first 
needed steps is to give them some 
insight into the academics debates.
This book, written by internatio-
nal young researchers from diffe-
rent academic fiFIelds (philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology, law 
9and biology), is an insight into 
some of the socio-ethical issues 
related to human enhancement 
that are discussed by academics.
These authors propose an 
analysis of the current and near future 
possibilities of human enhancement 
from different perspectives, ranging 
from a philosophical to a legal point 
of view, as well as getting insights 
from enhancing technologies that are 
already challenging the way we do 
and see sports, the way we guide our 
scientific discoveries, and the way we 
tackle age-related diseases. 
In order to be constructive, the 
debate addressing socio-ethical 
issues related to human enhance-
ment needs diversity, as proposed 
in this book. First, different ethical 
outlooks need to be represented 
for it to truly count as a debate. It 
seems fair to say that the various 
contributions to this volume do just 
that. While a number of them favour 
a middle ground between clear-cut 
“pro-enhancement” or “anti-enhan-
cement” positions, some authors 
raise a number of societal concerns 
about the rise of human enhance-
ment technologies, or suggest legal 
prohibitions in cases where some 
people would feel coerced into using 
them or would derive significant 
advantages from them not available 
to all (Chapter 2). By contrast, others 
provocatively argue, on grounds of 
fairness, against the existing bans 
on performance human enhancers in 
competitive sport (Chapter 5). Giving 
voice to such a diversity of ethical 
perspectives is a central goal of 
Future Human Life not only can this 
help ensure that the debate on the 
socio-ethical issues related to human 
enhancement will be democratic in 
nature, but we also believe that the 
strongest arguments on both sides 
should be heard, in order to raise the 
level of that debate and help everyone 
interested form their own opinion on 
those matters. Secondly, the debate 
calls for a diversity of disciplina-
ry approaches. The contributors to 
this volume provide us with this as 
well. They thus bring a background 
not only in ethics, but also in Greek 
mythology (Chapter 4), law (Chapter 
2), theology (Chapter 3), history 
(Chapter 1), evolutionary biology 
(Chapter 3), social science (Chapter 6) 
and epigenetics (Chapter 8). Chapter 
7’s mention of the rise of artificial 
intelligence is also very important. 
Computer performance is, after 
all, a dimension that has followed a 
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trajectory of exponential growth over 
the past half-century or so (what is 
known as “Moore’s Law”), and if this 
trend continues for at least a few more 
decades, it might eventually spell the 
dawn of superintelligent machines, 
a truly revolutionary development 
that could, among other things, help 
open up new, radical paths to human 
enhancement.
This convergence of different 
disciplines is necessary if the debate 
addressing the socio-ethical issues 
related to human enhancement is to 
be properly empirically informed and, 
ultimately, socially relevant. Hopeful-
ly we will see more of it in the years 
to come. In the meantime, we hope 
that this volume will serve as a useful 
introduction to the many issues 
raised by human enhancements for 
newcomers, and that it will stimulate 
reflection among all readers on a 
topic that should increasingly have 
a bearing on their lives as we move 
further into this fascinating century.
NOTES
1 http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/ and http://cser.org/ 
respectively, accessed December 17th, 2015.
References
Harris, J. (2007). Enhancing Evolution: The 
Ethical Case for Making Better People (Princeton 
University Press).
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Singularity is Near: When 
Humans Transcend Biology (Viking).
Menuz, V. (2015). Why do we wish to be enhanced ? 
In Inquiring into Human Enhancement : Beyond 
Disciplinary and National Boundaries, (Londre, 
GB: S. Bateman, J. Gayon, S. Allouche, J. Goffette 
and M. Marzano).
Powell, R., and Buchanan, A. (2011). Breaking 
Evolution’s Chains: The Prospect of Deliberate 
Genetic Modification in Humans. J. Med. Philos. 
36, 6–27.
11
« Lifespan enhancement could lead to a society 
where having several consecutive partners, 
several professional careers, several lives would 
be considered normal. »
« When the rich will be able to extend their life and 
the poor will not, the trench between these two 
pools will get deeper. »
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Chapter 1
In Search of the Elixir of Youth
I. Gupta,  K. Kakalacheva,  E. Saponara
«Live everyday as if you were to die tomorrow»
M. Gandhi
What would it be like if we were 
not to die tomorrow, the day after 
tomorrow or even for the next 100 
years or more? What would life be 
like if we were immortal and could 
live forever? A recent poll asked 
American citizens whether they would 
like to live to be 120 years old. 
The results were striking: although 
these respondents were eager to 
extend their life expectancy by 
another decade or so, more than 
fifty percent were ready to refuse 
a treatment that would extend 
their lives beyond 120 years of age 
(Pew Poll 2013). 
We asked the same question 
to Professor Yves Barral, whose 
research explores the processes of 
aging in yeast (S. cerevisae), which is 
a single-cell organism that is widely 
used as an experimental model in 
biology. He believes that any interfe-
rence with human aging might alter 
the beneficial aspects of this natural 
process: “Personally, I don’t think I 
would like to live for 120 years or more. 
I live now. I live in the present. (…) As 
we see in the case of yeast, aging is 
not only bad, but it also has some 
beneficial effects such as ‘memory’ 
and ‘experience’. By circumventing 
aging our cells might accumulate 
many more damaging effects.” The 
main purpose of Professor Barral’s 
research is not to find a cure for 
aging but instead to analyze nature’s 
complexities and elucidate the 
underlying mechanisms of why we 
age. 
 The results of the poll and 
Professor Barral’s perspective are 
surprising; however, throughout 
history, the yearning for immortality 
has set many philosophers, scientists 
and dreamers alike on the quest for 
the “Fountain of Youth”. With the 
current blinding speed of technolo-
gical progress, which has unquestio-
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nably improved the manner in which 
we live, we may wonder whether 
science and technology will one day 
advance to such an extent that they 
will radically increase our lifespan 
and (why not) even make us immortal. 
This scenario may resemble 
science fiction, but a quick examina-
tion into recent history illustrates how 
lifespan and human life expectan-
cy have considerably increased 
over time. Contrary to common 
assumptions, humans in the Stone 
Age did not have an extremely short 
lifespan. They did, however, have 
a much lower life expectancy. In 
contrast to the lifespan measure, 
which is the length of time for which a 
species lives and is determined by the 
biological specificities of a species, 
life expectancy is an average value 
that represents the number of years 
to which people may expect to live. 
Life expectancy in the Stone Age was 
heavily influenced by infant mortality, 
which was somewhat common at the 
time. Therefore, on one hand, although 
the inhabitants of the Stone Age had a 
life expectancy of only 30 years, most 
who survived childhood had excellent 
chances of living to 55 years of age. 
The Agricultural Revolution that 
followed, on the other hand, brought 
with it the problems associated 
with settled populations, including 
water contamination and epidemic 
diseases such as cholera, smallpox, 
polio and influenza. Life expectan-
cy during that period was approxi-
mately 38 years (Goscienski 2003). 
Despite the subsequent urbanization 
and development of the Medieval 
and Victorian periods, life expectan-
cy did not increase beyond 40 years 
of age primarily because of rampant 
malnutrition and epidemic diseases. 
Not until the medical advances of the 
1900s did life expectancy dramatically 
increase to 70 years. 
 The social and technological 
developments that have occurred 
over the last century have more than 
doubled life expectancy. A child born 
today in Japan – a country with one 
of the highest life expectancies in the 
world – is projected to live more than 
85 years. The current upward trend in 
life expectancy in most industrialized 
countries is estimated as the addition 
of 2.5 more years of life with every 
decade. If this trend continues at the 
same pace, it will take only 60 more 
years for our descendants to reach a 
life expectancy of 100 years (Bostrom 
and Roache 2008). 
 The factors that have contributed 
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to the last century’s dramatic increase 
in human life expectancy are linked 
to medical progress (mainly in the 
use of vaccinations and antibiotics), 
improved sanitation and hygiene, 
richer nutrition and better education. 
Such an enhancement of human 
life expectancy might therefore be 
considered as the result of technolo-
gical developments. If these are 
the factors that have contributed to 
increasing life expectancy in the past, 
one might wonder what will be the 
factors that sustain or even accelerate 
this upwards trend into the future.
 Chronic age-related diseases, 
including cardio- and cerebrovas-
cular disorders, cancer and renal 
failure, are the leading causes of 
death among the elderly (WHO 2013). 
Nevertheless, the aim of increasing 
life expectancy does not necessarily 
mean prolonging life with chronic 
age-related diseases. Instead, 
increasing life expectancy should aim 
at minimizing the effects of age and 
age-related diseases by increasing a 
person’s health span, which can be 
defined as the years during which a 
person is healthy. But how can we 
achieve such a goal? 
 Aubrey de Grey, a theoretical 
gerontologist, proposes that aging and 
everything related to it can be reversed 
by “engineering senescence”. 
According to his theory, “implemen-
ting a series of periodic medical 
interventions designed to repair, 
prevent or render irrelevant all types 
of molecular and cellular damages 
that cause age-related pathology and 
degeneration, may avoid debilitation 
and death from age-related causes” 
(de Grey and Rae 2007). Ending Aging: 
The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs that 
Could Reverse Human Aging in Our 
Lifetime. New York, NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 416 pp. ISBN 0-312-36706-6]. 
 However, a study that estimated 
the additional years that curing 
age-related diseases would bring 
points in a different direction. Thom 
and colleagues discovered that curing 
the number one cause of death in the 
developed world – cardiovascular-re-
lated disease – would add only seven 
years to a person’s life expectancy, 
whereas curing all cancers would 
contribute only three additional years. 
Obliterating cardiovascular disease 
and cancer altogether would prolong 
one’s life expectancy by approxima-
tely nine years (Thom 2006). Hence, 
rather different strategies should be 
deployed to radically increase our life 
expectancy. 
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 One such strategy might be 
to find methods for slowing down 
the aging process as a whole. To 
achieve this objective, scientists 
first must better understand the 
most minute details of the biological 
process of human aging and pinpoint 
the molecular targets that can stop 
or even reverse these processes. 
Currently, gerontologists – scientists 
who specialize in studying aging – are 
divided between two theories of aging; 
however, no unequivocal answer to 
the question of “why we age” has yet 
been found. 
 The first theory posits that, after 
our reproductive and parenting years, 
organisms undergo progressive wear 
and tear in their elementary biological 
constituents. This theory postulates 
that this damage can be caused 
by environmental factors such as 
exposure to radiation, toxins, ultravio-
let lights, and infectious diseases, all 
contributing to functional errors and 
the accumulation of damage in the 
body that ultimately leads to aging. 
 The second theory is called 
“programmed longevity”, and 
it suggests that longevity – the 
maximum number of years an 
individual of a given species can 
live – is biologically pre-defined and 
genetically regulated. According 
to this theory, the aging process 
is controlled by the body, which 
switches on a particular biological 
program of senescence. Therefore, 
aging should be understood more as 
a natural, pre-determined process 
of programmed degeneration rather 
than as wear and tear on the body. 
This second theory thus considers 
senescence to be a necessary part 
of evolution. Without aging and 
eventual death, there would be no 
pressure on the individual to survive 
and reproduce and consequently no 
evolution of the species (Prinzinger 
2005). If science progresses to the 
point that it is able to counteract the 
biological mechanisms that underlie 
aging and that lead an organism to a 
state of “negligible senescence”, then 
a paradox of biology and evolution will 
have occurred.
 Although aging is to a large 
extent determined by our genes, 
which regulate the predetermined 
senescence of our bodies, genetics 
is not the only factor that influences 
aging. Our environment – including the 
food we eat, our physical activity and 
our exposure to harmful chemicals 
and infectious diseases, among other 
components – exerts an essential 
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influence on our biological functio-
ning and plays an important role in 
how we age. 
 Calorie restriction – or 
the reduction of food intake – is 
a lifestyle-dependent anti-aging 
strategy that has attracted conside-
rable attention recently.  In the 1930s, 
it was shown that food restriction 
could extend the lifespan of laboratory 
rats by as much as 40 percent (McCay 
and Crowell 1934]. A 20-year-long 
study completed in 2009 confirmed 
the benefits of calorie restriction for 
lifespan extension and the delayed 
onset of age-associated diseases in 
primates, suggesting the same might 
hold true for humans (Colman 2009). 
However, the applicability of such 
a diet as a therapy against aging in 
humans is questionable. Nonethe-
less, thousands of people around the 
world are currently practicing calorie 
restriction. One example is the strictly 
ascetic members of the Calorie 
Restriction Society in the United 
States. 
Are people prepared to follow 
a strict dietary program that is 
based on low-calorie intake to 
achieve the promise of better 
health and longevity?
 
Whereas laboratory animals 
can be confined to restricted and 
controlled food supply, one cannot 
expect that humans would be able – 
or simply wish – to resist the constant 
temptation of the surplus food around 
us. Furthermore, the concept of 
a calorie restriction diet not only 
entails eating the right type of food 
in the appropriate amount but also 
implies that protein, essential fatty 
acids, vitamins, and minerals would 
be combined to form a well-balanced 
diet. Therefore, the correct amount of 
calories must be calculated without 
ending up in a malnourished and 
vitamin-deficient state. Finally, it 
would also be interesting to determine 
whether the developed world culture 
of over-abundance and encouraged 
consumerism will allow us to 
undertake such a dramatic lifestyle 
change. Again, scientists might hold 
the answer to achieving this goal. 
Drugs that mimic the effects of calorie 
restriction are currently under study. 
It may not be long before we might 
be able to take a pill and enjoy a rich 
and unhealthy meal while tricking our 
bodies into healthy youth. Nonethe-
less, the ability to easily neutralize 
our misbehavior might challenge our 
will power and our capacity ability to 
17
take responsibility for our lives. 
 In addition to attempting to 
reverse the aging processes of the 
body’s tissues, aged body parts might 
simply be replaced by completely new 
and compatible parts. Heart bypasses, 
artificial joints and organ transplanta-
tion have existed for years as means 
of repairing broken parts. However, 
they are frequently associated with 
poor compatibility or even rejection 
by the recipient organism. For this 
reason, scientists are current-
ly striving to characterize a special 
type of cells called stem cells, which 
are believed to be the fundamen-
tal units of regeneration. Stem cells 
are an undifferentiated type of cell 
with two remarkable properties: they 
can renew themselves through cell 
division and can also differentiate 
into a great variety of specialized 
cell types to constitute bodily organs 
such as skin and the heart. In many 
tissues, including the stomach and 
bone marrow, reservoirs of stem cells 
serve as an internal repair system. 
Is it possible that we may one day 
develop the ability to renew our 
bodies indeFInitely?
 Harnessing the potential of 
stem cells to renew malfunctioning 
organs is an objective aimed at by 
many research groups. However, 
research on stem cells has sparked 
some controversy. The use of 
embryonic material – which has been 
the primary source of stem cells – has 
raised fervent resistance in the past, 
mainly from religious and conserva-
tives groups. 
To overcome the ethical concerns 
related to the use of embryonic 
stem cells, scientists are studying 
methodologies to generate stem 
cells by reprogramming differen-
tiated adult cells. 
The idea is to take the patient’s 
differentiated skin cells, revert them 
back into stem cells (also called 
induced pluripotent stem cells or 
iPS) and program them to differen-
tiate themselves into specialized 
cells, such as hepatocytes, which can 
be injected into the person’s liver to 
repair its functions. Whereas rejection 
of foreign organs is commonplace in 
organ transplantation, one particular 
advantage of iPS therapy is that the 
recipient is not expected to reject the 
newly generated organ because it is 
made of his own reprogramed cells. 
 As a result of scientific technolo-
gies such as those discussed above, it 
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might be imagined that gaining 25 to 
50 more years of life could result not 
in the mere addition of these years to 
our mature age but in the extension of 
each individual stage of our lives. We 
perhaps would then have more time 
to enjoy childhood and more time for 
educational development. We might 
even be able to spend one-half of 
our lives engaging in one profession 
and the other half in a completely 
different occupation or would simply 
have more time for our families and 
hobbies.
 In reconsidering the possibi-
lities of lifespan extension through 
genetics, lifestyle changes, or stem 
cell therapy, the myriad questions 
that our society will ultimately have to 
face is baffling: 
How can we sustain the pharma-
ceutical costs generated by the 
extra medical care necessary 
to prevent aging, to circumvent 
diseases and to guarantee optimal 
nutritional balance? 
Are we prepared to handle 
the social impact caused by a 
population living longer ? We already 
face problems such as economic 
recessions and unemployment. What 
would these problems be like when 
older people hold onto their jobs and 
resources for even longer ?
 Last but not least, these 
supreme social and medical 
standards have always been part of 
the luxury package of the richer part 
of the world. 
When the rich can extend their 
lives and the poor cannot, the 
gap separating these two groups 
will grow, pulling these social 
categories further apart.
 
Lifespan extension, however, 
may lead to a distortion of the rules 
of social coexistence, allowing for 
behaviors that are presently conside-
red amoral, such as old-age pregnan-
cy. Currently, giving birth above the 
age of 60 is the topic of debate: what 
if 60 turns into the new middle-age? 
The same conundrum affects the 
question of euthanasia: currently, this 
practice is the topic of heated debate 
by religious groups and ethicists 
and is considered an artificial way 
of discontinuing a life that is unable 
to be enjoyed and healthily lived. 
However, what if one simply grows 
tired of life after becoming immortal ? 
Would euthanasia become the means 
by which life is brought to an end ?
It is difficult to say whether 
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the ability to extend our lives in the 
future would be a boon or a curse 
to mankind. If scientists are able 
to clear the hurdles of the research 
challenges involved and devise 
an ultimate panacea, i.e., lifespan 
extension, one final challenge will 
likely remain before us: tackling the 
social and moral implications of such 
an ultimate power. 
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« If enhancement drugs become common practice 
in the workplace, new laws will have to be 
designed and implemented. » 
« (...)Factory workers might be expected to take 
pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers to counteract 
tiredness and fatigue and enable them to work 
longer shifts. »
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Chapter 2
Enhancing human enhancement :     
a legal perspective
D. Shaw
«There are fascinating ethical questions about human enhance-
ment, but it is often forgotten that it is ultimately the law which 
will decide how these issues are dealt with» 
D. Shaw
Much of the discussion regarding 
human enhancement has focused 
on ethical issues. Should we make 
ourselves smarter using pills? Is it 
ethical to allow athletes to “dope”? Is 
it right to bestow particular qualities 
upon our children through the use of 
technology? 
These are fascinating questions. 
However, it is often forgotten that it 
is ultimately law, rather than ethics, 
that will finally decide how we must 
address these issues. The law is 
frequently accused of lagging behind 
technological and pharmaceutical 
developments, which appears to be 
even more likely to occur in the case 
of human enhancement, where both 
science and the ethical debate are 
moving rapidly. We might wonder 
whether the law will successfully 
anticipate and regulate the cutting-
edge questions posed by the utiliza-
tion of technologies for enhancing 
humans. In this chapter, I examine 
how natural, national and internatio-
nal laws address issues related to 
human enhancement.
Natural law
Some of the oldest objections 
to human enhancement derive 
from the concept of “natural law”. 
In essence, natural law attempts to 
determine moral rules using basic 
facts about human “nature” and 
“function”. Natural law is conceived 
of in contradistinction to “positive 
law”, i.e., the rules established by 
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various societies. It has been argued 
that natural law entails that many 
forms of human enhancement should 
be outlawed because the very aim of 
enhancement is to alter individuals’ 
natural biological state (Anderson 
and Tolefson 2008). However, it can 
also be argued that the very nature 
of human beings is to find solutions 
that improve who we are, including 
our natural biological state. We are 
constantly attempting to improve 
ourselves by learning new facts and 
skills through new experiences. In 
this sense, we can even argue that 
education itself is a form of human 
enhancement (Harris 2007), and few 
supporters of natural law would argue 
against education. 
Although it is often claimed that 
human enhancement is “unnatu-
ral” (Anderson and Tolefson 2008), 
this statement has little legal or 
ethical force. 
For example, hospitals and 
schools are not natural – they are 
human-made institutions – but we 
use them because they provide us 
clear benefits. Thus, based on the 
principles of natural law, it can be 
argued that education and healthcare 
are forms of human enhancement. 
Natural law may seem to be interes-
ting from a theoretical perspective, 
but it does not provide any useful 
information on how to address human 
enhancement in practice.
National laws
Various national laws already 
tightly regulate one form of medical 
intervention that has been considered 
by some to be human enhancement: 
plastic surgery (Stern 2013). Although 
initially developed for therapeutic 
purposes (such as restoring function 
after an accident or a disease), the 
use of plastic surgery for aesthetic 
enhancements – hereafter referred 
as “cosmetic enhancement” – soon 
became popular all over the world. 
Given the potentially dramatic side 
effects of such interventions (even 
a “nose job” might result in a heart 
attack or a blood clot), cosmetic 
enhancements are strictly regulated 
to protect patients against risky and 
ill-advised medical practices. Despite 
some notable behavior involving 
misconduct such as the “Poly Implant 
Prothèse” scandal in France (Willsher 
2013), this regulation has largely been 
successful.
 Although cosmetic enhance-
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ment runs the risk of undesirable 
side effects, other forms of human 
enhancement through technologi-
cal modifications might have clearly 
beneficial effects on health. For 
instance, it has been observed that 
people from wealthier backgrounds 
tend to be healthier than those from 
poorer backgrounds (Shaw 2014). 
If people who grow up in poorer 
areas tend to die younger because 
of their lower quality of life and 
lower levels of education, we may 
wonder whether providing them with 
cognitive enhancers might help them 
make healthier choices, which would 
reduce health inequalities between 
rich and poor. 
In other words, cognitive enhan-
cement might be used as a means 
of improving public health (Shaw 
2014). 
Any such intervention would 
necessitate governance by means of 
a legal framework, particularly if it 
were available to everyone, as is the 
case in the USA with fluoride-en-
hanced public water supplies (Shaw 
2012).
We should examine other types of 
technologies that may lead to human 
enhancement. First, extending our 
lifespan by fighting diseases is one of 
the most widely accepted objectives of 
our industrialized societies. However, 
extending our lifespan substantially 
using the new tools offered by modern 
technology poses certain problems 
that may require legal regulation. For 
example, what might be the impact on 
societies if the average lifespan were 
increased up to 1,000 years through 
the use of life-enhancing technolo-
gies? Such a scenario might make it 
necessary for countries to create new 
laws to prevent the public from using 
such life-extending technologies to 
limit the impact on medical and natural 
resources (and on the environment 
through increased CO2 emissions). 
Denying public social care for such 
technology would likely be relatively 
easy. However, legislation might also 
be required to prevent the private 
use of such life-extending technolo-
gies to prevent the emergence of a 
two-tier system in which the very 
rich could live very long and healthy 
lives, whereas ordinary people could 
not. Second, many countries already 
have laws governing pharmaceuticals 
that enhance humans. For example, 
certain drugs that improve alertness 
and other cognitive abilities – such as 
methylphenidate (Ritalin), for example 
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– are available in most industria-
lized countries only by prescrip-
tion. Most of these laws have been 
enacted for safety reasons because 
there is not yet sufficient data on the 
potential side effects of pharmaceu-
tical “cognitive enhancers” and 
because they might become addictive 
if overused. Whereas current laws 
and regulations govern the use of 
cognitive enhancers for therapeu-
tic purposes quite well by making 
them available only by prescription, 
they might also be used “off-label” 
by individuals aiming to enhance 
certain of their cognitive abilities 
rather than to treat the disease or 
health problems for which the drug 
was developed. From a “risk/benefit” 
perspective (i.e., balancing the risks 
vs. the benefit that these drugs may 
have on those using them), the use 
of such a drug might be considered 
more “risky” for healthy people due 
to the unpredictable and (perhaps) 
undesirable side effects associated 
with the pharmaceutical than such 
use would be for people who require 
the drug to restore normal function. In 
other words, taking the risk of the side 
effects to restore “normal functio-
ning” might be worth it; however, 
taking such a risk to improve cognitive 
skills beyond what might be conside-
red “normal” might not be worth it. In 
this regard, regulation and legislation 
should be developed to regulate such 
off-label use of drugs in a way that 
also permits the responsible use of 
enhancement.
 New laws may also be required 
to prevent “enhancers” from being 
used unfairly. For instance, some 
educational institutions (Lamkin 
2011) are already considering banning 
the use of “cognitive enhancers” 
such as Ritalin by their students 
during exam periods because of the 
unfair advantage such drugs may 
offer. In addition, it has previously 
been suggested that some types of 
“enhancers” should only be available 
to people who obtain “enhance-
ment licenses” that indicate that 
they understand the risks of using 
such “enhancers” and who agree to 
take them only if doing so does not 
jeopardize the integrity of their own 
life and/or the lives of others.
if human enhancement becomes 
common practice in the work-
place, then new laws will have to 
be designed and implemented. 
On one hand, it might be necessary to 
regulate employers who try to force 
25
their employees to use “enhancers” 
to improve efficiency. 
For example, factory workers mi-
ght be expected to take pharma-
ceutical cognitive enhancers to 
counteract tiredness and fatigue 
and enable them to work more ef-
fectively and/or for longer pe-
riods of time. 
Although current labor laws in 
some countries may forbid pressuring 
employees to take such drugs, it might 
be necessary to draft new legislation 
that specifically addresses the use of 
“enhancement technologies” in other 
countries. Indeed, some healthcare 
workers must already accept what is 
arguably a type of enhancement in the 
form of flu vaccinations; some schools 
also require children to be vaccinated if 
they wish to attend. On the other hand, 
colleagues – rather than employers 
– might also pressure individuals to 
use “enhancers”. If the unofficial use 
of enhancers were to become popular 
in particular professions, some 
professionals might feel obligated to 
use them, as is already the case with 
respect to surgery in the following 
scenario. Surgery is a competitive 
profession. If some surgeons began 
using cognitive enhancers, they might 
become better at their jobs, leading 
other surgeons to use such cognitive 
enhancers. Furthermore, although 
employees should be protected from 
pressure to use performance-en-
hancing drugs, they might also face 
litigation if they make professional 
errors that might reasonably have 
been prevented by an “enhancer”. 
For instance, if a “non-enhanced” 
surgeon made a mistake during an 
operation, he might be sued for not 
having taken a performance-enhan-
cing drug that might have helped him 
prevent the error. In summary, new 
laws similar to those that present-
ly regulate “doping” among athletes 
may be required to regulate both 
the employer-endorsed and the de 
facto use of enhancing drugs in the 
workplace.
 The field of criminal law may 
also be interested in enhancing some 
criminals with “mood stabilizers”. 
Just as some sex offenders are 
“chemically castrated”, advanced 
“mood stabilizers” might be used to 
reduce the risk of recidivism among 
criminals. Similarly, so-called 
“morality pills” may soon become 
a reality. With such a drug, those 
convicted of crimes could choose to 
take pills that might help them make 
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better moral choices. Alternatively, 
of course, they might be forced to 
take such pills as a condition of their 
release. Cognitive enhancers might 
even be used to improve certain 
aspects of criminals’ cognition (in 
cases in which they have below-ave-
rage cognitive levels). For instance, 
such enhancers might help them find 
work after release from prison or 
(more cynically) face their trial. 
Finally, some governments might 
consider giving “morality pills” to 
citizens who demonstrate a high 
risk of engaging in criminal beha-
vior to reduce the risk that they 
might break the law in the future. 
In this case, we may wonder how such 
governments would determine what 
behaviors are considered to represent 
a potentially “high risk of criminality”. 
“Mechanical implants” may also raise 
new legal challenges. For example, 
Google Glass and other wearable 
devices incorporate technologies 
that can film videos, take pictures, 
read emails and/or surf the web. In 
a world in which people might easily 
and secretly record everything they 
see, new laws would be necessary to 
protect privacy and confidentiality.
International laws
Whereas societies probably want 
to legislate the use of technologies 
that might lead to human enhance-
ment, the ramifications for internatio-
nal law are not immediately obvious. 
For instance, enhancing soldiers by 
means of technological modifica-
tions might have significant implica-
tions for the laws governing interna-
tional conflicts and war crimes. 
When considered necessary, armies 
can essentially force their soldiers 
to take any technology or drug that 
may enhance their performance. For 
example, a new drug might enable 
soldiers to stay awake for 48 hours 
without tiring, and/or bionic implants 
might make them extraordinarily 
strong. If pharmaceutical and bionic 
interventions were to make the 
soldiers of rich nations such as the 
United States even more formidable 
adversaries, the military dominance 
of a few large nations would be 
enhanced to a staggering degree, 
reducing the ability of smaller, less 
advanced nations to defend themsel-
ves.
 Sports constitute another 
arena of international regulations 
(also known as “soft laws”) affected 
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by human enhancements. Most 
people are familiar with the Lance 
Armstrong scandal and the wider 
problems of doping in sports. For 
decades, the consensus has been 
that improving athletic performance 
using drugs is deeply wrong and 
unsportsmanlike. However, recent 
revelations concerning the extremely 
common and widespread use of 
doping substances in some sports has 
led some authors to call for doping 
substances to be permitted (Savules-
cu, Foddy, and Clayton 2004). Although 
these views remain in the minority, 
the regulations governing sports may 
have to change at some point in the 
future if doping in a particular sport 
becomes the norm rather than the 
exception. There is a parallel debate 
regarding the use of technologies 
that may enhance physical capacities 
in sport. For instance, the use of 
“bionic” body additions, such as Oscar 
Pistorius’ running blades, has been 
widely discussed (Lewis 2011). It is 
typically regarded as fair for disabled 
athletes to use such artificial limbs, 
but in some cases – including that of 
Pistorius – these “replacement body 
parts” might actually perform better 
than normal biological human limbs.
 Finally, it is possible that new 
international laws will have to be 
implemented to govern “enhance-
ment tourism”, in which citizens from 
a homeland in which the use of a given 
enhancing technology is forbidden 
might choose to travel to another 
country in which it is available. We can 
easily make a parallel with “fertility 
tourism”, in which people seek access 
abroad to reproductive services that 
are forbidden in their own country. 
The prospect of some countries 
allowing many forms of human 
enhancement – whereas others 
are more prohibitive – also creates 
the ability for these countries to 
establish economic sectors based 
on developing technologies that 
offer human enhancements.
 A related issue involves groups 
of countries such as the European 
Union. These unions of states 
might want to implement legisla-
tion on strategies regarding the use 
of enhancing technologies so that 
citizens of all member states continue 
to have the same rights and opportu-
nities in the workplace, for instance.
In other words, if enhancement 
in the workplace were permitted 
in some states but not in others, 
the rights of workers in permis-
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sive states might be eroded. Simi-
larly, some countries might feel 
compelled to adopt a permissive 
attitude toward enhancement to 
remain competitive (Menuz, Roduit, 
and Hurlimann 2013).
 
Any future laws governing 
the enhancement of humans will 
be based on an ethical consensus 
regarding the key issues. The current 
consensus is that the three main 
areas of ethical concern are safety, 
coercion and fairness. The law 
must therefore prevent the use of 
unsafe technologies for purposes of 
enhancement, prevent people from 
being forced to use technologies to 
enhance themselves when they do 
not wish to do so, and prevent people 
from unfairly benefiting from the use 
of such technologies. Whether in the 
workplace, on a running track, or in 
the race to live to 200 years old, the 
wondrous potential of enhancement 
must be regulated by carefully drafted 
legislation.
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« Modern medicine has considerably reduced 
the tragic toll of negative selection, but such 
achievement of our industrialized societies (...) 
bring long-term accumulation of deleterious traits. »
« Solutions to limit those deleterious traits 
will be based on the use of combined advances, 
among others, of biotechnology, robotics and 
nanotechnology. »
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Chapter 3
Human enhancement and evolution
J. Aguilar-RodrIguez and A. Rezaee Vahdati
«Humankind is about to enter a new phase of evolution.»
J. Craig Venter
The biological sciences are 
evolving at an unprecedented pace. 
Following the discovery of DNA and 
the rise and spread of digital technolo-
gy, the biosciences are experien-
cing spectacular advances that are 
expanding our comprehension of the 
living world and our ability to control it. 
Humankind is at the door of a new era 
of biological design, an era dominated 
by powerful technologies capable 
of improving not only the world in 
which we live but also our own bodies 
and minds. If such biotechnological 
interventions in or on human beings 
come to pass, we might finally be able 
to domesticate the process that has 
created us and that is continuously 
modifying us: evolution. 
Evolution is sometimes deFIned as 
a change in the composition of the 
traits of a population over time. 
One of the causal mechanisms 
for most (but not all) of this change is 
natural selection. Natural selection is 
the process by which inheritable traits 
that favor survival and reproduc-
tion increase their prevalence in a 
population from one generation to 
another. In other words, traits that 
favor their individual carriers become 
more common in a population (positive 
selection), while deleterious traits 
become rarer (negative selection). 
Beginning with a given population, 
after many generations, natural 
selection may lead to the creation of 
subpopulations displaying different 
traits. Now, imagine that this natural 
selection process acts over millions 
of years: ultimately, traits between 
subpopulations might become so 
dissimilar that each subpopula-
tion becomes “something” quite 
different. In other words, by means 
of natural selection, they diverge 
to such an extent that they can no 
longer interbreed, transforming 
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them into new species. This process 
is called speciation. All living beings 
that inhabit the Earth descend from a 
form of life that lived more than 3.5 
billion years ago: the “last universal 
common ancestor” (LUCA). Since 
LUCA, life has unceasingly branched 
out through speciation to finally create 
all the species that lived and that are 
currently living on Earth. 
As is true of any other biologi-
cal species, we humans are also the 
product of evolution through natural 
selection. However, in our case, 
human culture has also played a 
crucial role during our own evolutio-
nary process. 
The advent of culture has shelte-
red us from the harsh environment 
faced by our prehistoric ances-
tors, mitigating many environ-
mental pressures that molded our 
traits in the past. 
However, the advent of culture 
has also created subtle selective 
forces that have participated in the 
forging of modern human beings, such 
as “lactase persistence”, which is the 
ability to digest lactose into adulthood. 
Lactase is an enzyme that allows us to 
break down lactose (a sugar present 
in milk). Active during childhood, 
lactase is normally switched off as 
children grow older. However, the 
persistence of this enzyme during 
adulthood has become a common 
trait in certain human populations. 
This persistency correlates with 
the domestication of dairy animals 
over the last ten thousand years. 
In other words, the increase in the 
frequency of individuals showing 
lactase persistence constitutes an 
adaptation driven by the consump-
tion of non-human milk beyond 
infancy. This trait is highly beneficial 
for populations with diets containing 
high levels of dairy products and 
clearly illustrates how human culture 
can influence the presence – and/or 
absence – of certain human characte-
ristics. 
Although human beings have 
been forged by evolution through 
natural selection (among others 
causes), we may wonder whether 
we are continuing to evolve. Some 
commentators – such as the 
geneticist Steve Jones, the naturalist 
Sir David Attenborough and the late 
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould 
– have expressed doubt about such 
contemporary processes of evolution 
(Gould 2000; Bellutz 2008; Furness 
2013). They claim that human beings 
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do not actually evolve anymore 
because modern medicine has 
considerably reduced the tragic toll 
of negative selection by correcting 
the deleterious effect that some traits 
may have on individuals. 
Medical interventions have been 
extremely successful in improving 
human living conditions, even for 
those individuals carrying traits that 
may cause serious morphological, 
behavioral and physiological problems 
(e.g., hemophilia and diabetes, 
among others). However, it would 
be an oversimplification to assert 
that improved living conditions have 
stopped the evolution of the human 
species. Although many societies have 
reduced mortality rates by means 
of advances in medicine and social 
policies, many developing countries 
in which fatal diseases (e.g., malaria) 
remain and impose strong selective 
pressures. As a consequence, at 
least in these countries – which 
account for the majority of the global 
human population – natural selection 
continues to select traits that confer 
survival and reproductive advantages. 
In addition, several studies have 
characterized natural selection in 
human populations from industria-
lized countries, suggesting that it 
remains in effect. For instance, the 
“Framingham Heart Study” – an 
ongoing medical health survey on 
all Framingham inhabitants since 
1948 (Massachusetts, USA) – has 
consistently measured changes in 
citizens’ so-called health markers 
such as blood pressure, choleste-
rol, blood sugar levels and body 
weight. Surprisingly, scientists have 
found certain correlations between 
health markers and the number of 
descendants. For example, women 
with lower blood pressure and 
cholesterol levels tend to have more 
children. These results might support 
the proposition that human evolution 
has not ground to a halt in contempo-
rary populations and that we humans 
remain under the tight control of the 
“natural forces” that have made us.
Moreover, there is another 
side to the story. Medical progress 
and progressive social policies have 
substantially reduced the efficiency of 
negative selection (i.e., the decrease 
in traits that are not favorable in a 
given environment). 
Nevertheless, authors such as 
James Crow (1997) and Bill Hamilton 
(2002) both evolutionary biologists – 
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believed that:
«This achievement of our indus-
trialized societies does not occur 
without costs because it leads to 
the long-term accumulation of 
“deleterious” traits.»
Normally, natural selection 
ensures that the recurring input of 
deleterious traits in each generation 
is balanced by the selective elimina-
tion of such traits. According to 
these authors, by reducing the 
latter, medical interventions favor 
the steady accumulation of such 
deleterious traits in individuals who 
live in industrialized countries. The 
immediate effect of such deleterious 
traits can be minimized – or mitigated 
– by medical interventions. However, 
these authors believe that this 
situation will be unsustainable in the 
long-term and that it might become 
problematic for the long-term future 
of the human species.
In this sense, authors such as 
Alexey Kondrashov (2012a, 2012b) 
and Michael Lynch (2010), both 
geneticists, share a rather stark 
vision of the future of humanity. They 
have both recently suggested that 
the residents of developed countries 
are accumulating deleterious traits 
because they are less subject to 
negative selection. According to their 
arguments, it is probably the first time 
in human history that this accumula-
tion is occurring at such a high rate. 
Lynch believes that future human 
beings in wealthy countries will likely 
be “(…) different in just two or three 
centuries, with significant incapaci-
tation at the morphological, physiolo-
gical, and neurobiological levels” 
(Lynch 2010, 966). 
 One may wonder whether these 
authors are harbingers of doom or 
whether they may be – at least partial-
ly – correct in their assessments. 
Experimental evidence supports their 
claim that accumulated deleterious 
traits can affect a population quickly 
and detrimentally. For instance, when 
fruit flies – a commonly used animal 
in experimental biology – are bred 
in conditions of relaxed selection, 
they display a rapid accumulation of 
deleterious traits and soon exhibit 
a decline in their ability to survive 
and reproduce. Another example is 
“intracytoplasmic sperm injection” 
(ICSI), an in vitro fertilization technique 
that is frequently proposed for men 
who display few or no spermatozoids 
in their semen. A single sperm cell 
can be collected and artificially 
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injected into a mature egg, thereby 
forming an embryo. The newly 
created embryo is then transplanted 
into a woman’s uterus, in which it will 
continue its development through the 
end of gestation. However, a caveat of 
this technique is that boys conceived 
through ICSI can inherit their father’s 
severe sperm problems, making 
them infertile as well, which clearly 
indicates how deleterious traits that 
would normally have been removed 
from human population can persist 
over generations due to medical 
intervention.
A crucial question emerges 
here: will we be able to find solutions 
for eliminating – or at least limiting 
– the unwanted effects related to the 
accumulation of deleterious traits in 
human populations? We may hope 
that, in the near future, our scienti-
fic and technological abilities will be 
powerful enough to diagnose, repair, 
or – at the very least – limit the effect 
of deleterious traits. After all, sterile 
boys conceived through ICSI could use 
the very same technique to overcome 
their sterility. In that sense, the 
advent of CRISP/Cas9 is promising. 
This is a rapidly advancing technique 
that endows scientists with the ability 
to easily alter the genomes of living 
cells – including germ line cells, i.e., 
sperm and egg cells. Alterations in 
these cells are particularly important 
for evolution because changes in their 
DNA are inheritable. This technique 
has previously been used to edit the 
DNA from fertilized eggs in monkeys.
Moreover, such a technology, 
which is able to reverse detrimental 
traits, might also be used to introduce 
changes to express “desirable” traits, 
allowing individuals to have greater 
control over their biological destiny.
Such “improvements” will likely 
be based on the use of combined 
advances of, among others, 
biotechnology, robotics and 
nanotechnology. 
Biological bodies could therefore 
become a combination of organic and 
artificial parts. Modified individuals 
may live longer, show increased 
cognition, be physically stronger and 
be better looking compared with 
unmodified people. 
However, the technological 
challenges required to modify human 
beings using biotechnology, including 
by means of CRISP/Cas9, will not 
be small. The main problem is that 
the effect of an introduced change 
can vary substantially from person 
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to person – and from environment 
to environment. This phenomenon 
will make it practically impossible to 
accurately predict the effect of most 
modifications, at least in the near 
future. Moreover, the improvement of 
a trait can be the cause of unwanted 
deficits in related traits. For example, 
individuals with eidetic/photographic 
memory typically also have synesthe-
sia. The stimulation of one of the five 
senses leads to an automatic reaction 
in another, i.e., hearing a particu-
lar sound triggers seeing a specific 
color. Because of these problems, the 
modification of human beings in the 
near future is more likely to originate 
from the fields of robotics, nanotech-
nology and pharmacology.   
Some thinkers have postulated 
that radical technological interven-
tions in our biology may transform 
us into “something different” from 
what we are. In other words, they 
believe that large-scale applica-
tion of technology in or on human 
beings might make them evolve into 
“something else”, a “new species” 
of hominids. Is it plausible? To 
answer this question, we first must 
understand how Homo sapiens – the 
humans we are now – appeared on 
Earth. We humans are the result of 
millions of years of evolution. Fossil 
records indicate that our first hominid 
ancestors lived approximately seven 
millions years ago in Africa. These first 
hominids were quite different from us 
and looked more like apes. We may 
wonder what made them evolve into 
the highly intelligent species that we 
are. 
There are various compelling 
theories that address this question. 
One theory is perhaps more convincing 
than the others. During the nineteen-
th century, Charles Darwin – the 
first person on Earth to coherent-
ly propose that species have evolved 
through natural selection – thought 
that bipedalism set our ancestors 
onto the path of becoming what we are 
now. By releasing their hands from 
locomotion, these primitive humans 
could use them as tools. According to 
Darwin, “Man could not have attained 
his present dominant position in the 
world without the use of his hands, 
which are so admirably adapted to the 
act of obedience of his will» (Darwin 
1871, 135). 
In addition, the taming of fire is 
arguably considered one of the pivotal 
events in human evolution. Cooking 
helps us digest food more rapidly 
and efficiently. Such a reduction in 
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the time spent feeding and digesting 
led these primitive humans to invest 
more time and energy resources in 
new activities. It is also believed that it 
helped humans allocate more energy 
for thinking and resolving day-to-day 
problems. The act of thinking is 
energy consuming. Whereas the 
modern human brain represents 
approximately 2.5% of our body 
weight, it consumes approximately 
20% of the body’s total energy budget. 
Therefore, the energy that is saved by 
the shorter period of time we require 
to digest our food can be redirected 
for brain activity, which may have had 
an impact on the improvement of our 
intellect. Therefore, cooking by fire 
might be another example of how 
technological advances have modified 
our biology. 
Furthermore, approximately 
2.5 million years ago, a shift in the 
evolution of hominids occurred. At 
that time, Africa experienced unusual 
climate instability that consisted 
of sequential changes between dry 
and rainy climates. These climate 
changes resulted in the extinction of 
many species and imposed new and 
strong selective pressures on the 
hominids, which were forced to adapt 
to survive. Those who developed more 
sophisticated hunting strategies 
(i.e., weapons) survived and had 
descendants. 
Roughly knowing how Homo 
sapiens appeared, we may now explore 
whether the large-scale application 
of technology in or on human beings, 
together with substantial socioeco-
nomic differences, might make 
them evolve into a “new species” 
of hominids. Many science-fic-
tion writers have speculated about 
a possible future speciation for 
humanity. For instance, in The Time 
Machine (1895), H.G. Wells imagined 
humans evolving into two different 
and opposing species: “Elois“ and 
“Morlocks”. The first are beautiful 
frugivorous creatures who are, by 
nature, childish, stupid and weak. 
They are the descendants of wealthy 
humans who lived comfortably in a 
utopian Earth as the result of the 
systematic application of technology. 
The second species are hideous albino 
creatures that prey on the “Elois“ and 
live in underground and mechanized 
cities. They are the descendants of the 
poor working classes. Wells’ imagina-
tion notwithstanding, given the time it 
has taken to “make” the humans who 
we are, it is highly improbable that 
technological modifications of our 
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biology will soon lead to speciation. 
Moreover, speciation implies the 
creation of an initially homogenous 
subpopulation, i.e., populations that 
share identical traits. In addition to the 
technological modifications that may 
be necessary to repair deleterious 
traits, individuals may wish to have 
traits according to their personal 
preferences, therefore leading to 
more diversity than unity between 
individuals. 
Combating the adverse effects of 
deleterious traits – and enhancing 
other traits – will be costly. Will 
this ability be restricted to a rich 
minority?
 Or will it instead be accessible to 
anybody who may wish to use it? Should 
we worry about a schism between the 
enhanced rich and the unenhanced 
poor, similar to that between the 
“Elois” and the “Morlocks”? Conside-
ring the current social and economic 
differences between individuals, the 
possibility of emphasizing some of our 
traits – such as cognitive capacities or 
lifespan, for instance – will probably 
not be available to all. Many people in 
today’s world do not have the luxury of 
having enough to eat, whereas others 
live under harsh dictatorships that 
may not allow people access to the 
relevant technology. Industrialized 
countries struggle with unemploy-
ment and income inequality (for 
example, the 2011 census data (www.
census.gov) showed that half of the 
U.S population lives in poverty or 
near poverty). We believe that crucial 
socio-ethical issues related to human 
“enhanced evolution” would mainly 
concern the justice aspect of its 
application. 
We have evolved from other 
animals, but evolution is not over for 
us. Evolutionary changes continue 
and will continue to occur in human 
populations. Some of these changes 
are the product of cultural and 
technological advances, but we do not 
have any control over them at present. 
We are changing in ways that we may 
not consider desirable. Nonetheless, 
it is possible that, in the near future, 
we may achieve greater control over 
our own evolution with the help of 
technology. It may be possible that we 
will be able not only to stop unwanted 
changes but also to introduce 
desirable changes. Technology will 
undoubtedly accelerate human 
evolution. What is more doubtful is 
the extent to which we will be able to 
control such a process and to select 
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the evolutionary trajectories we may 
take.
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« DOPING is not inherently unfair. TALENT is.» 
« Dopped sportsmen could be considered as  a new 
category of players, for whom the bar must be 
heightened (...) and handicaping rules applied, 
giving advantage to non-dopped. We already did 
it for Oscar Pistorius, Tiger Woods, we negociate 
such classifications all the time. »
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Chapter 4
If doping is wrong, why do we love 
Popeye? Let’s topple talentocracy.
P. Bonte
«Talent is meritless birth privilege. Doping, in contrast, can 
emancipate those less lucky at birth. To celebrate athletes 
born with ‘noble blood’ smacks of aristocracy. Let’s stop 
protecting their privilege, let’s stop discriminating against 
dopers.» 
It’s the First Olympics, and 
“BLAM!”, Hercules uppercuts Popeye 
straight to the moon. Looks like 
K.O. for our sailor man. Luckily, the 
goddess of Spinachio takes pity. She 
slips some green goo down his pipe – 
and what a boost! Muscles popping up 
all over his body, Popeye rockets back 
to Athens and knocks Hercules out 
cold. In this 1951 cartoon, the crowd 
roars in jubilation. Olive Oil swoons: 
Popeye, my hero!
But how much of a hero is Popeye in 
the eyes of the World Anti-Doping 
Agency?
 Sports should be about effort 
and fair play, right? Now look at 
Dopeye. His muscles grew without 
any effort: the superspinach did it for 
him. Plus Spinachio only gave the goo 
to Popeye: poor Hercules had none, 
he didn’t even know about it. Even if 
Hercules could have doped himself 
with superspinach too, some would 
think that the competition would 
still be unfair. As ex-Tour de France 
cyclist Jonathan Vaughters writes: 
“To argue that if everyone is doping 
and using the same dope, then it’s 
fair, is bunk. Different drugs affect 
different metabolisms in different 
ways and some people will always 
benefit more from certain drugs than 
others. This is why doping must end, 
or we will not get to see who is truly 
the best” (Vaughters 2004). 
So on the one hand, our culture 
is filled with cartoons celebrating 
magic boosts, effortless and unfair. 
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On the other hand, ‘doping sinners’ 
are being hunted down and shamed 
like witches. Here we have a deep 
contradiction running through our 
moral culture. How can we resolve 
this? Here are two basic options:
Plan A: 
We rewrite our children’s 
stories, in which we promote, through 
the behavior of heroes such as 
Popeye, Asterix and countless others, 
taking enhancing substances to gain 
strength, cunning and other winning 
qualities. 
Plan B: 
Alternatively, we bring the 
sports world in line with the morality 
we impress upon our children: if you 
can get your hands on a foodstuff, 
potion, genetic manipulation (think of 
Spiderman) or some type of enhance-
ment technique, and it is sufficient-
ly safe, then do it, even if it requires 
only minimal effort and is not equally 
available to others.
My sympathies go to Plan B, 
resoundingly. Long live our loveable 
doping heroes, down with zero-tole-
rance anti-doping. Here’s why.
What is doping?
What does “doping” mean, 
exactly? The World Anti-Doping 
Agency considers any substance or 
method to be doping if it (1) might 
enhance performance, (2) might 
pose a health risk to the user, and/
or (3) offends WADA’s “Olympic spirit 
of sport” (WADA 2015: 30). Only two 
of these three criteria must be met. 
This means that when a substance 
enhances performance and offends 
this spirit, it is doping, even if a 
substance or method is healthy. 
So what is this “Olympic spi-
rit” then? 
According to the World 
Anti-Doping Code, “the essence of 
Olympism [is] the pursuit of human 
excellence through the dedicated 
perfection of each person’s natural 
talents.” (World Anti-Doping Agency 
2015: 14). I don’t get this. 
Why must sports be categorical-
ly talent-based? How fair is that 
toward those who were born with 
less talent? 
The moral beauty of cartoons such 
as Popeye is that through doping, the 
naturally weaker, less talented Popeye 
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can finally win against natural-born 
strongmen like Hercules and Bluto. 
This is why I still cheer for 
Popeye, even if he is exposed as a 
Dopeye. Maxwell Gladwell, author 
of the bestselling David and Goliath: 
Underdogs, Misfits and the Art of 
Battling Giants shares this sentiment. 
Doping can be “the means by which 
pudgy underdogs could compete with 
natural wonders” (Gladwell 2013). 
Nevertheless, anti-doping is still 
frequently defended in the following 
zero-tolerance manner: (a) doping is 
intrinsically wrong, i.e., wrong under 
any and all conceivable conditions; 
(b) morally, nobody should ever 
be allowed to dope; and (c) doping 
should be universally forbidden – 
certainly by the internal regulation of 
sports associations, and often also by 
(criminal) law. (Murphy 2013) 
Luckily, in response to a growing 
group of critics (see Tännsjö 2000; 
Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton 2004; 
Mehlman 2009), less extreme policies 
are being considered within the ranks 
of WADA officials. They acknowledge 
the basic right of individuals in liberal 
democracies to exercise bodily 
freedom even at great risk (Murray and 
Murray 2011; see also Brownsword 
2012). Ironically, it is precisely the 
practice of sport that frequently sets 
the very low standards of health that 
we can paternalistically impose: we 
allow individuals and groups to expose 
themselves to great, even lethal risks 
such as cycling down sharply twisting 
Alpine roads, dangling on treacherous 
mountains in the freezing cold, racing 
neck-and-neck in ultrafast cars, and 
playing high-impact collision sports, 
such as rugby, football, basketball, 
wrestling and boxing. Clearly, many 
doping practices will be less risky 
than many of the sporting activities 
we currently allow people to practice. 
Consequently, anti-doping zero-to-
lerance should be curtailed in two 
ways. First, only doping that has been 
proven to have or that reasonably 
should be presumed to have a very 
excessive risk profile can be legally 
forbidden. Second, other forms of 
doping must be legally permitted and 
can only be forbidden within those 
private associations that chose to ban 
them.
However, that is only an argument 
for tolerance, permissiveness and 
indifference. I want to advance a 
much deeper, more disturbing set of 
arguments. I have addressed moral, 
existential, religious and aesthetic 
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arguments for doping elsewhere 
previously (Bonte 2012). In this 
article, I want to discuss fairness and 
non-discrimination. 
I argue that anti-doping zero-to-
lerance might be a form of undue 
discrimination even in a private 
sports association. 
For instance, intolerance toward 
the medically supervised intake of 
Erythropoeitin (EPO) – a popular 
doping agent in cycling – may be 
illegitimately discriminatory.
Talentocracy: the love of 
hereditary privilege
What is talent? Here is how 
Sigmund Loland and Hans Hoppeler 
characterize it:
Genetic factors are the predispo-
sitions for developing the relevant 
phenotypes for good performances 
in a sport[.] A person with good 
predisposition is usually characte-
rized as a ‘talent.’ Talent in this sense 
is distributed in the so-called ‘natural 
lottery’ and based on inheritance. 
(Loland and Hoppeler 2012: 3)
I note four elements. Talent is (1) 
unmerited, the result of a lucky draw in 
the natural lottery; (2) effort-reducing, 
making certain types of performance 
easier relative to those with lesser or 
no such talent; (3) biochemical, made 
up of biochemical substrates, such 
as a naturally elevated amount of red 
blood cells, which is what others need 
EPO for; and (4) genetic, innate and 
transferrable to future generations.
Examined in this light, talent 
can be disparaged in the very same 
way many people disparage doping: 
it is an unmerited, effort-reducing, 
biochemical advantage. The only 
differences seem to be that talent is 
something you are born with. 
Certainly, if you stumble on 
some talent that you were born with, 
it is yours to keep, and nobody has 
the right to, say, load weights on 
your ankles if you were born faster 
than others or throw a veil over your 
face if you were born more beautiful 
than others. However, it is as equally 
certain that, to use Barack Obama’s 
famous phrase, “you didn’t build 
that”. You as a person do not deserve 
praise simply because you were born 
with greater “biocapital” than others, 
just as we should not think more of 
somebody with the good fortune of 
being born into a mansion and a 
greater bank account. 
Suppose that you were not born 
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with great biocapital. Can you undergo 
some enhancement procedure to 
endow yourself with similar or even 
superior bodily capabilities compared 
with those who were born talented? 
Can others impose some ban on 
you that says “no”, it is absolutely 
forbidden, you will be punished for 
it and you are a fraud and a freak 
for doing so? From this perspective, 
the categorical anti-doping morality 
seems to fly in the face of this basic 
moral right to emancipate yourself 
from natural incapacitation.
Why, then, do anti-doping 
absolutists nevertheless push for a 
categorical internal ban on doping? 
Why do they mobilize a surveil-
lance and police force to control 
athletes for biological orthodoxy, 
and stigmatize, with religious fervor, 
those individuals caught meddling 
in this form of modern witchcraft 
as “doping sinners”? One plausible 
answer is that they would do so out of 
adoration for what Thomas Jefferson 
called “nature’s aristocracy” (Cappon 
1959, Ch. 15, doc. 61). By setting up 
enforced endowment-based tests of 
certain qualities, we can see emerge 
from the huddled masses those who 
innately hold these qualities to a 
superior degree. This ‘true, natural 
aristocracy’ can then be publicly 
celebrated as those who are “truly the 
best”. Numerical rankings, offering 
big shiny medals for all to see: that 
would do the job perfectly. 
Such a “spirit of sport” would lite-
rally be as aristocratic as ever: a 
celebration of those with “nobler 
blood” – those “of superior stock”, 
to use the eugenicist phrase. 
It would be a true talentocra-
cy: a hardline brand of aristocratic 
thought that has wizened to the fact 
that hereditary superiority does not 
follow superficial familial, class or 
caste affiliations. A better understan-
ding of the natural world has now 
revealed that innate superiorities 
can be found throughout the entire 
populace. Therefore, if you want 
to sift through the aristocracy and 
install the superior beings in their 
rightful thrones, then you should 
invest substantial effort in providing 
everyone with “equal opportunity” of 
development and participation. 
Micheal Dunlop Young, the 
satirical inventor of the phrase 
“meritocracy”, wrote convincingly 
how, under the sheepskin guise 
of meritocracy, many supposedly 
“liberal” and even “socialist” activists 
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in fact advance an agenda of heredita-
ry privilege – a talentocratic ordering 
of society. (Young 1958) The desire in 
sports to discover and celebrate, in the 
words of Vaughters, “who is truly the 
best” – similar to the desire in beauty 
pageants to do the same with who is 
“truly” and “naturally” most beautiful 
– may be the most glaring example 
of such “scientifically enlightened” 
aristocratic thinking. 
Zero-tolerance anti-doping 
as discrimination 
Having exposed the danger of 
talentocracy, let me now attempt to 
nail down the argument announced 
above: that anti-doping absolutism is 
illegitimately discriminatory.
The basic principle of non-discri-
mination teaches that all rele-
vantly similar things should be gi-
ven equal treatment. 
To return to Dopeye and 
Hercules: both are muscular, both 
are good at Olympic sport(s), both 
are willing to compete and both are 
confident that they might win; thus, 
a test of strength between the two 
would possess “the sweet tension of 
uncertainty of outcome”, a central 
component in a meaningful competi-
tive game, according to sports 
philosopher Warren Fraleigh (1984). 
They differ only in how they obtained 
their muscles. Is this a relevant 
difference, allowing us to deny 
Dopeye access to the Olympics or to 
disqualify him when we discover that 
he is hopped up on superspinach? 
More broadly, are we discrimi-
nating when we ban participants 
from entering the playing field when 
they obtained their relevant ability 
to play via some complex cocktail 
of talent+training+effort+doping 
yet allow those who obtained their 
relevant ability to play via another 
complex cocktail involving all manner 
of talent+training+effort but without 
doping? I think we often are. Specifi-
cally, we discriminate when, after 
closer inspection, we find that the 
doper did not violate the so-called 
constitutive rules of the game: rules 
that, if broken, cause you to no longer 
be playing the same game. Let us 
pitch some arguments to see whether 
doping actually causes one to no 
longer play the same game.
Strike One: rules of in-game 
structure
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What is a game? A quick and 
classic definition is given by Bernard 
Suits: “the voluntary overcoming of 
unnecessary obstacles.” (Suits 1978) 
Thus, a game requires obstacles 
that (a) actually are obstacles, that 
is, that provide a challenge, but (b) 
a challenge that can, in interesting 
ways, be overcome. The implica-
tion is that every game is designed 
for a certain type of player. For such 
players, you must hit a sweet spot of 
providing the right amount and the 
right type of challenge.
Take a basketball court. The 
dimensions of the court, the height 
of the hoops, the size of the balls, 
the duration of the game – these are 
all specifically calibrated to provide 
specific challenges to persons with 
a healthy human constitution. When 
skilled humans play the game, it can 
be a beautiful sight to behold. A game 
such as Space Jam (Pytka 1996), 
however, where 3-meter tall monsters 
compete against tiny Porky Pigs and 
Tweety Birds would actually make no 
sense at all: these characters simply 
do not fit the structural dimensions 
and conventions of our fit-to-hu-
man-size basketball courts and 
rulebooks. 
Now, is the absolutist anti-doping 
rule also such a constitutive, 
structural game rule? No, it is 
not. It is true that, in some fanci-
ful cases, doping would create 
excessively different and dispro-
portionate types of players, such 
as when an extreme growth hor-
mone created players who were 
three meters tall. 
However, even then, would this 
phenomenon pose a fundamen-
tal problem? No. It would only pose 
a brief organizational problem, a 
problem that is not peculiar to doping 
and that has been solved a million 
times before. 
New forms of training, in-ga-
me strategizing, improvement 
in equipment, etc., can equally 
confront us with problems such 
as some players who begin to 
“overshoot the mark”. 
We solve these problems in two 
general ways. Solution one: similar to 
how the size of football goals or the 
height of basketball goals increases 
from children to adult players, you 
raise the bar, and in so doing, you 
create a new category of players who 
play the same game, only now with a 
higher bar or goal to suit their size. 
Solution two: you add rules about 
handicaps and/or advantages to 
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the game. For instance, you provide 
players of a shorter stature a head 
start or a bonus point. Both solutions 
can be applied to “prosthesis dopers”, 
such as Oscar Pistorius, who run not 
on lower legs not made of flesh-and-
blood but of fiberglass legs, or to 
“surgical dopers”, such as Tiger 
Woods, who use Lasik eye surgery to 
obtain vision that is better than 20/20. 
Either you make them play in diffe-
rent categories or else you let 
them remain but add a handicap 
rule to compensate the unfair ad-
vantage they have over different-
ly legged or eyed competitors.
 We constantly negotiate such 
classifications and equilibrations in a 
satisfactory manner. The problem is 
not moral; it is simply organizational.
Strike Two: rules of in-game 
psychodynamics
Ultimately, the obstacles in our 
games are not merely of a physical 
or strategic nature. The challenge of 
the game will always be psychological 
as well – a test of character, cunning, 
willpower and the like. Does doping 
pose a categorical danger to the 
maintenance of such a meaningful 
psychological dimension? No, it does 
not. 
First, some think doping is 
intolerable because it makes things 
too effortless. In the case of EPO, 
this notion is utterly mistaken. For 
instance, Tyler Hamilton (Lance 
Armstrong’s wingman for many 
years) writes the following about EPO: 
“EPO granted the ability to suffer 
more; to push yourself farther and 
harder than you’d ever imagined, in 
both training and racing. It rewarded 
precisely what I was good at: having 
a great work ethic, pushing myself to 
the limit and past it” (Hamilton and 
Doyle 2013, 58). It is also contradicto-
ry: the use of talent and natural ease 
in performance would then have to 
be intolerable as well. What is more, 
certain forms of doping actually 
increase the need for willpower: this 
is what anabolic steroids do. Steroids 
are willpower- and effort-enhancing 
doping: they reduce recuperation 
time, which means that, if you have 
the willpower to keep exercise all the 
time, steroids allow you to do so. They 
do not simply grow muscle for you. The 
documentary Bigger Stronger Faster 
vividly paints that picture for you (Bell 
2008). Second, if some type of doping 
would make some feat too easy, that 
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is not a problem. Do what Hamilton 
and countless other athletes like him 
do: raise the bar. The same psycholo-
gical intensity, if not more, will be 
required to overcome that new, more 
difficult obstacle.
Strike Three: rules of prepa-
ration
Constitutive game rules can 
extend beyond what occurs during 
game time. They can also regulate 
how you prepare and practice before 
the game begins. Indeed, the entire 
point of game time can be to test how 
different players have made the most 
of the pre-game period of prepara-
tion, during which everyone also had 
to respect certain rules. One such rule 
of preparation may be that nobody is 
allowed to dope.
In this regard, however, strictly 
talent-based sports seem more 
problematic than doping. Demanding 
that only talent and traditional food 
will be the tolerated biochemical 
substrates of performance cannot 
be a sensible constitutive rule. For 
one, it is too crude. What is sensible 
would be, for instance, to demand 
that all competitors must not exceed 
a specific range of capacity for 
maximum oxygen uptake. Moreover, 
to favor one unmerited, effortless, 
biochemical substrate of the ability 
to play (talent) over another (doping) 
would be senseless discrimination.
To use a contemporary example, 
it may certainly make sense to 
restrict the hematocrit level of all 
Tour de France cyclists to 50 and to 
deny access to all riders with higher 
levels, as former UCI chairman Hein 
Verbruggen once proposed. Verbrug-
gen was willing to allow any method 
to achieve this mark of 50, doping 
included. Riding a Tour de France 
with a higher hematocrit level was 
nonsensical to him because it would 
be too dangerous. However, you 
can make similar decisions to cap 
a certain parameter at some point 
not only for health reasons but also 
because the obstacles would lose 
too much of their challenge beyond 
a certain point or, inversely, might 
become excessively challenging 
(as in the case of too-tall monsters 
and too-tiny Tweety Birds playing 
basketball against one another on a 
human-sized court). 
People were outraged at Verbrug-
gen’s proposal, arguing that it was 
akin to saying that stealing is wrong 
but everyone can steal until they have 
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50 EUR in their pocket. (Hamilton and 
Doyle 2013, 42) However, for me, this 
outrage may serve as a classic case 
of (unwitting) talentocratic thinking. 
The correct analogy here is this: some 
people are born with 50 EUR on their 
bank account, whereas other people 
make choices (exercise, develop 
strategy, dope, etc.) to obtain 50 EUR 
on their bank account. Surely, people 
should be allowed to catch up with the 
people who were simply born rich?
 When the dust settles, there 
is no great drama here. Strike one, 
strike two, strike three: anti-doping 
zero-tolerance is out and did not hit a 
single argument.
Down With Talentocracy
Doping is not inherently unfair. 
Talent is. Policies that shield the 
well-born from competition by dopers 
create a glaringly unfair talentocra-
cy. Michael Dunlop Young said “Down 
With Meritocracy” (2001). I would like 
to specify: down with talentocracy, up 
with opportunity. My proposal is in fact 
quite basic. This makes it compatible 
with all sorts of libertarian, liberal or 
socialist thought. My case has simply 
been this: stop discriminating against 
the naturally worse-off. Hurrah for 
Popeye standing up to Hercules, 
hurrah for Dopeye standing up to the 
talentocrats. Our doping cartoons tell 
the right story: stop glorifying the ‘true, 
natural aristocracy’, stop discrimina-
ting against those who responsibly 
enrich their bodies with biotech. If 
we can get our morals and politics 
halfway right, then biotechnological 
enhancement will be emancipation.
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« There is continuity between the myths and the 
different views on human enhancement. » 
« When enhancement critics invoke Icarus, they give 
voice to the awareness of danger and humility in 
the face of human limitation conveyed by that myth 
since Antiquity. » 
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Chapter 5 
Heracles or Icarus : 
Mythological References in
the Human Enhancement Debate
T.Franssen and E.Malmqvist
«Let us be the New Prometheans. Let us unite in our commit-
ment to boldly go where none have gone before in search 
of the knowledge by which to transcend the limitations of 
the human condition» 
(Young 2006)
“In his moment of triumph, Promethean man will become also 
a contented cow”
 (Kass 2002).
An intense debate currently rages 
over the possibility and desirability of 
radically altering human characteris-
tics by means of technologies such 
as in vitro fertilization (IVF), cloning, 
genetic engineering, information 
technologies, nanotechnologies and 
artificial intelligence. Some vigorously 
advocate using such technologies not 
only to overcome disease and disability 
but also to “enhance” our capabilities 
and expand our cognitive and physical 
powers far beyond the normal range – 
and perhaps even to pursue immorta-
lity. Others passionately argue against 
such “human enhancement” and 
object that seeking to cross the limits 
of human “nature” would threaten 
human dignity, erode the meaning of 
valuable social practices or even of 
life itself, or result in other disastrous 
consequences. 
Nothing seems more novel 
than this debate launched as the 
result of the most recently developed 
technologies. It is therefore striking 
that this same debate is frequent-
ly riddled with ancient mythological 
references. Both proponents and 
opponents of human enhancement 
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refer to these characters in support 
of their arguments. This chapter 
explores the significance of these 
references. We show how both sides 
of the “enhancement debate”  invoke 
mythological figures and explain how 
these figures relate to their views. We 
end by suggesting that Greek mytholo-
gy influences the manner in which 
we think about enhancement more 
deeply than is commonly recognized 
and that acknowledging this influence 
might help cool down the frequently 
overheated debate.
Mythological characters 
invoked by proponents of 
enhancement
Proponents of human enhance-
ment are optimistic about the 
prospects of using newly developed 
technologies to overcome our current 
limitations. Some advocate for 
considerably expanding the human 
life span. For instance, David Gems – 
a scientist working on the biological 
process of aging – argues that:
« aging should not be considered 
a “normal process” but a “special 
form of disease”, at least in human 
beings (Gems 2011, 109). »
Gems believes that this redefini-
tion may help us more efficiently 
work on human age-related diseases. 
Currently, each illness on the broad 
spectrum of age-related diseases is 
studied independently. To emphasize 
the lack of effectiveness that this 
single approach has for patients’ 
health, Gems use the metaphor of the 
hydra that Heracles must kill. “For 
clinicians, the challenge of treating 
illnesses in the elderly must at times 
seem like Heracles’ triumphs of 
combating the multi-headed Hydra. 
Each time one head was severed, two 
more would sprout in its place” (110). 
Although Heracles’ task seemed 
impossible at the outset, he finally 
succeeded by burning the Hydra’s 
neck stumps after each decapitation. 
Gems suggests an even more radical 
approach to fighting ill health in the 
elderly: “In principle, a more effective 
way to tackle human age-related 
illness would be to intervene in ageing 
itself. Deceleration of ageing provides 
protection against the full spectrum 
of diseases of ageing thereby assuring 
late-life health, and strikes at the 
heart of the Hydra of ageing” (ibid.). 
For Gems, the Hydra represents 
aging and death, two evils that 
should be resisted and/or overcome. 
There is one important aspect of 
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Heracles’ tale that seems particu-
larly relevant to his argument that 
Gems does not explicitly discuss. 
The Hydra was the guardian of the 
world of death. Therefore, by analogy, 
killing the Hydra of aging may offer 
us some semblance of control over 
death. In other words, fighting aging 
may reduce age-related illnesses, 
which in turn may delay death and 
truly increase the human lifespan. 
Although Gems acknowledges that 
some may feel uncomfortable with it, 
“the only serious option is to adapt as 
best as we can to a future involving 
ever greater extension of lifespan” 
(111). He is confident that we will have 
the Heraclean courage and capacity 
to overcome our current human 
condition and believes that we have a 
responsibility to do so.
 Gerontologist Aubrey de Grey 
is another firm supporter of life 
extension whose views have been cast 
in mythological language. De Grey 
believes that “we are close enough 
[to the biomedical revolution] that our 
action (or inaction…) today will affect 
the date at which ageing is defeated”. 
(De Grey and Rae 2007, xi) He expects 
“many people alive today to live to one 
thousand years of age and to avoid 
age-related health problems even 
at that age” (325). His enthusiasm 
and strong belief in scientific 
progress is aptly described in the 
book’s dedication as “tirelessly and 
courageously bearing Promethean 
fire” (vii). 
Prometheus was a clever Titan 
god. When Zeus devised a plan to wipe 
out the human species, Prometheus 
took pity on the mortals, stole fire from 
heaven and gave it to them. He also 
granted wisdom to these still rather 
ignorant beings, taught them various 
techniques and arts, and in several 
versions of the myth, he even took 
part in the creation of humankind.
 
Because of his courageous, 
boundary-crossing, creative and 
technological nature, Prome-
theus has become a popular icon 
within the human enhancement 
debate. 
With Promethean courage, de 
Grey bears the fire of humanity’s 
future improvement, which is life 
extension.
The figure of Prometheus is 
also assigned an important role by 
Simon Young, the author of Designer 
Evolution. Young asserts that :
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« the greatest tragedies in life are 
human biological limitations and 
death. »
 
Unwilling to accept the suffering 
and restrictions that accompany 
such limitations, he put his trust in 
the power of science to eventual-
ly conquer them. “Humanity will 
take evolution out of the hands of 
butterfingered nature into its own 
[…] hands” (38). For him, “Designed 
Evolution” is the inevitable next step 
in humanity’s history of self-impro-
vement; overcoming our biological 
limitations is no mere wish but our 
natural destiny. “[The] goal of human 
life is survival – we are programmed 
that way” (15-16). Young claims that 
humans naturally have 
“the instinctive drive of a 
conscious entity to expand its 
abilities in pursuit of ever-increa-
sing survivability and well-being” 
(39). 
This “will to evolve” is incarnate 
in the figure of Prometheus, who 
represents “the innate human drive 
to increase knowledge and abilities, 
even at the expense of present 
pains” (ibid.) – the drive to progress, 
improve, enhance. Although Young 
acknowledges that a future of 
self-enhancement is not without 
risks, he believes that rejecting the 
“Prometheus Drive” would mean 
to remain forever constrained by 
the power of our limitations and to 
continue suffering from disease and 
death. He writes: “Let us be the New 
Prometheans. Let us unite in our 
commitment to boldly go where none 
have gone before in search of the 
knowledge by which to transcend the 
limitations of the human condition. Let 
us cast aside cowardice and seize the 
torch of Prometheus with both hands” 
(40). In relating the tale of Prometheus, 
Young encourages people to employ 
Promethean bravery and creativity, 
to enlighten themselves with the fire 
of knowledge that will enable them 
to end their suffering, overcome their 
limitations and enhance themselves.
Mythological characters 
invoked by opponents of 
human enhancement
In contrast to the views surveyed 
thus far, many people seriously 
question the possibilities and/
or desirability of technological-
ly enhancing human beings. The 
ethicist Alfred Nordmann strongly 
criticizes the speculative and fantasi-
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zing character of the pro-enhance-
ment arguments: “The contemporary 
fascination with space travel, artificial 
intelligence, and genetic enginee-
ring has led to the resurrection of the 
age-old visions of the transcendent 
power of artifacts and techniques 
to transform the human condition. 
We are constantly being presented 
with retellings of the classic tales 
of conquest and ingenuity that can 
be subsumed under the ‘myth of 
progress’. More than two millennia 
after the sun melted the wings of 
Icarus for coming too close, we are 
still under the spell of hubris, trying 
to fly higher and higher” (Nordmann 
2007, 32).
The myth Nordmann refers 
to is that of Daedalus and Icarus. 
While imprisoned with his son Icarus 
in a labyrinth on Crete, the clever 
craftsman Daedalus thought of a way 
that the two might take flight and 
escape their imprisonment. Thus, 
Daedalus created two pairs of wings 
out of feathers and wax, one pair 
for himself and one pair for his son. 
Before they flew off, Daedalus warned 
Icarus not to fly too high, but when he 
found himself moving freely through 
the air, Icarus became captivated by 
his enthusiasm and flew higher and 
higher. As he neared the sun, the 
heat melted the wax of his wings, his 
feathers fell off and the boy fell into 
the sea and drowned.
This myth is about hubris: it warns 
of the dangers of unrealistic 
imagination, over-ambition, and 
overestimation of one’s own 
powers.
 In noting this myth, Nordmann 
implicitly warns of the danger 
that people might let themselves 
become seized by Icarian hubris 
when imagining, believing in and 
pursuing unrealistic objectives, such 
as transforming the human condition. 
The message here is that caution is 
important because over-ambition can 
be truly perilous.
 The political philosopher 
Michael Sandel (2004) and the 
scientist and medical ethicist Leon 
Kass (2002) have both criticized the 
attitude that they believe motivates 
human efforts at self-enhancement. 
Both these thinkers believe that a 
deeply objectionable desire to master 
nature lies at the root of these efforts. 
Notably, following the enhancement 
advocates discussed above, Sandel 
and Kass employ the allegorical value 
of the myth of Prometheus. However, 
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for these critics of self-enhancement, 
the story does not symbolize heroism 
or progress but instead warns of the 
dangers of ambition. Sandel argues 
that biotechnological enhance-
ment represents “[…] a Promethean 
aspiration to remake nature, including 
human nature, to serve our purposes 
and satisfy our desires. The problem 
is not the drift to mechanism but the 
drive to mastery. 
And what the drive to mastery 
misses and may even destroy is an 
appreciation of the gifted character 
of human powers and achievement” 
(Sandel 2004, 54). Losing this apprecia-
tion, Sandel believes, threatens to 
undermine some of society’s most 
cherished values: humility in the face 
of human imperfection and solidarity 
with the least fortunate. 
To a greater degree than Sandel, 
Kass believes that : 
« what is at stake is our very 
humanity. » 
Because the goals of medicine 
– which traditionally have been 
understood to be healing diseases and 
avoiding death – have recently been 
extended to include human enhance-
ment, “human nature itself lies on 
the operating table” (Kass 2002, 4). 
According to Kass, we risk “dehumani-
zation”, and we risk reaching the 
point at which we will no longer 
pursue anything “humanly richer or 
higher” (9) than health, amusement 
and pleasure. The problem with the 
project of enhancing humans is that it 
extends the drive to control nature to 
our very minds and souls. 
The “Promethean man”, as charac-
terized by Kass, is the human who 
has lost all her humanity due to 
her unsatisfiable urge for techno-
logical mastery – a materialist 
drive so strong in its search for 
enhancement that it takes away 
precisely what made her human 
and what gave life meaning: desire, 
pain, pleasure, love and, essen-
tially, mortality. 
“Here, the final technical 
conquest of his own nature would 
almost certainly leave mankind 
utterly enfeebled [...]. Homogenisa-
tion, mediocrity, pacification, drug-in-
duced contentment, debasement of 
taste, souls without loves and longings 
– these are the inevitable results 
of making the essence of human 
nature the last project for technical 
mastery. In his moment of triumph, 
Promethean man will become also a 
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contented cow” (48).
Sandel’s and Kass’s worries 
correspond to the side of the 
Prometheus myth that enhance-
ment advocates tend to overlook. 
When Zeus discovered his misdeed, 
Prometheus was severely punished. 
Zeus chained the rebellious god to 
a rock, where each day a vulture ate 
his eternally regenerating liver until, 
many centuries later, Heracles freed 
him. In other words, our drive to 
mastery will ultimately cost us dearly, 
as it did Prometheus. 
 Following the lead of Kass but 
focusing on sports, applied ethicist 
Mike McNamee challenges “the 
hubris of modern biomedical science” 
and its “vertical ambition in transfor-
ming our very nature as humans” 
(McNamee 2007, 182-3). He asks us 
to reflect on the concept of victory. 
Once you have become an elite athlete 
with considerably higher capacities 
due to technological enhancements, 
what would remain of the meaning 
of winning? McNamee draws on 
the Odyssey to explore this issue . 
After his ship is wrecked in a storm, 
Odysseus is rescued by the divine 
beauty Kalypso, who offers him “a life 
of endless pleasure, without suffering 
or fatigue”. “This life”, says McNamee, 
“of course stands in marked contrast 
to the vulnerabilities, struggles and 
eventual death that define the shape 
of human life” (McNamee 2013, 
194). However, Odysseus rejects the 
offer and chooses instead to return 
to Ithaca, where Penelope, his wife, 
is waiting for him. He chooses to 
continue his mortal life, accepting 
both its dangers and its agony. 
McNamee quotes Martha 
Nussbaum, who explores Odysseus’ 
choice in her essay, “Transcending 
Humanity”: “We don’t quite know 
what it would be for this hero, known 
for his courage, craft, resource-
fulness, and loyal love to enter into a 
life in which courage would atrophy, 
in which cunning and resource-
fulness would have little point, since 
the risks with which they grapple 
would be removed” (Nussbaum 1990, 
366). Even love would be different. 
Nussbaum wonders “where, and who, 
in such a life, would our hero actually 
be? 
Do we wish for him a good result 
that involves a transformation 
so total that he might not remain 
himself?” 
(ibid). McNamee draws an 
analogy to a robot that would be a 
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perfect firefighter. While operating 
very efficiently and effectively, such a 
robot would not be considered heroic 
because, as a machine, it would risk 
nothing and would have nothing to 
lose. “What is missing are the possibi-
lities of choice, fear, an understanding 
of life that might be saved, or risked, 
and so on” (McNamee 2013, 195).
Our disposition toward technolo-
gically transformed athletes 
performing excellently would surely 
be similar: “Would any kind of a 
proverbial vocabulary, such as we 
employ of virtuous and vicious, 
be apt? The nature and limits of 
human excellence shape the kinds 
of admiration we have for those who 
aim at perfection, humanly conceived. 
The framework gives meaning to the 
action and its evaluation” (ibid.).
 McNamee chooses the myth 
of Odysseus to show that a heavenly 
existence of endless pleasure would 
deprive life of its meaning. Virtue and 
victory derive their value and signifi-
cance from the very fact that humans 
have limits. Thus, the only athlete 
whom we can genuinely marvel at is 
the one who, despite these limitations, 
nevertheless dares to undertake 
the risky odyssey toward human 
excellence.
 
Learning from mythology ?
It might be wondered why 
both sides of the debate on human 
enhancement draw so heavily 
on ancient Greek mythological 
figures. At first glance, it might be 
thought that these myths are simply 
convenient and apt illustrations of the 
positions taken by different debaters 
that make their views more vivid and 
accessible without having much to 
do with the content of these views. 
We agree that ancient myths can 
be clarifying illustrations of elusive 
philosophical concepts. However, 
their sheer ubiquity suggests that 
they are more than that. We suspect 
that it is no accident that participants 
in the enhancement debate constant-
ly return to these particular myths 
(rather than to other narratives). 
There is continuity between these 
myths and the variety of views on 
human enhancement
These views are colored by the 
same complex attitudes that these 
myths have inspired over the course 
of their history.
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InvokING Prometheus : 
When proponents of enhance-
ment invoke Prometheus:
« They express admiration for his 
bravery and thrill at transcen-
ding the boundaries that this myth 
has always evoked. In addition. »
InvokING ICARUS : 
When enhancement critics 
invoke Icarus:
« They give voice to the awareness 
of danger and humility in the face 
of human limitations that this 
myth has conveyed since antiquity. »
 In this sense, contemporary 
thinking on human enhancement is 
part of the living and evolving legacy 
of these myths.
What, if anything, can we learn 
from recognizing that mythology not 
only illustrates different contempo-
rary views on enhancement but 
also helps shape these views? The 
pessimistic conclusion is that we 
might as well abandon any attempt 
to solve the perplexing socio-ethi-
cal questions that the possibilities 
of human enhancement raise. If the 
ancient Greeks grappled with these 
questions and if humanity still has not 
answered them despite its attempts 
over the last two and a half millennia, 
can we genuinely hope to be able to 
answer them today? Better, it seems, 
to spend our time and energy on more 
worthwhile pursuits that might have 
a direct impact on the problems that 
humans currently face. 
Although such pessimism might 
not be altogether unwarranted, we 
want to hint at a different and more 
productive conclusion. There is an 
important sense in which confron-
ting the history of our thoughts 
and passions renders them more 
comprehensible. Indeed, this insight 
animates a range of different intellec-
tual traditions: from Marxism through 
psychoanalysis to hermeneutics. 
Explicitly or implicitly, these traditions 
all assume that reflecting on the 
origin and evolution of present ideas 
and attitudes – on how these ideas 
and attitudes came about – allows 
us to understand them better. In this 
spirit, we suggest that taking their 
mythological references seriously 
might make participants in the human 
enhancement debate more humble 
regarding their own views. There is 
no doubt some truth to the charge 
that enhancement critics remain in 
the grip of irrational fears, just as 
there is some truth in the charge that 
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enhancement enthusiasts are overly 
excited about current prospects for 
human enhancement. To the extent 
that both fear and excitement can 
cloud reasoned judgment, they must 
sometimes be tempered. Tracking 
the history of such reactions is useful 
in this regard because it provides a 
critical perspective on them. 
Enhancement critics have much to benefit 
from realizing that concerns about new 
practices and technologies have sometimes 
proven unwarranted. Similarly, enhancement 
proponents have much to benefit from realizing 
that enthusiasm for scientific and technological 
progress has sometimes proven to have been 
overblown. Such realizations might make each 
side of the debate more cautious with respect to 
their own convictions and, ideally, more likely to 
recognize that they share more than they might 
think with the other side (Parens 2005). Although 
it largely reiterates ancient and unresolved 
socio-ethical quandaries, there is yet hope for 
progress in the debate on human enhancement.
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«These technologically controlled environments 
can monitor, control and manage many aspects 
of our everyday lives: from the health and general 
well-being of senior citizens to air and water 
quality, atmospheric conditions and our domestic 
energy consumption.» 
«How can we ensure that our technological 
advances accord with our values?»
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Chapter 6
Science and technology, towards 
enhancing the human condition 
L. Cabrera, X.Kerasidou and O.Burton.
«Humanity faces an uncertain future as technology learns 
to think for itself and adapt to its environment.” 
(Stephen Hawking)»
 
In recent decades, the scienti-
fic world has witnessed a surge in 
the implementation of ideas original-
ly conceived in science fiction. Feats 
previously understood as objects of 
imagination are now understood as 
goals to be pursued by interdisciplina-
ry groups of individuals including, but 
not limited to, scientists, engineers, 
and people working in the humanities 
and the arts. These modern progres-
sive thinkers are arguably taking us 
toward a technological revolution 
that will change our lives in unprece-
dented ways, much like the industrial 
revolution changed Europe during 
the 19th century. In this chapter, we 
first introduce some of the technolo-
gical developments in the fields 
of computer science and informa-
tion technology that are thought 
to be of great promise for human 
enhancement. Second, we address 
and discuss some of the socio-ethi-
cal and political issues related to the 
implementation of such technologies.
Computer science and infor-
mation technology: a ‘smar-
ter’ technological world
Artificial intelligence (AI) 
addresses the study, development 
and use of “intelligent” machines 
and software. Most of us have been 
introduced to AI mainly in science 
fiction literature, movies and media, 
with images such as HAL’s red 
camera eye – the sentient, calm, yet 
murderous computer that controls 
the systems aboard the spacecraft in 
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: Space
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Odyssey (1968). Highly intelligent 
AI, such as HAL, very much remains 
a futuristic vision shared by a few 
commentators and does not depict 
reality. Nonetheless, what has been 
termed “weak” (or “narrow”) AI is 
already at the core of many aspects 
of our everyday lives. Weak AI is 
typically focused on narrow tasks 
and exhibits limited intelligence and 
no traces of sentience. Medicine, 
engineering, finance, entertainment 
and many military applications rely 
on weak AI. Current forms of weak AI 
can schedule appointments, allocate 
resources for large corporations, 
make financial predictions, play chess 
and land aircraft. 
Many – if not most – smartphone 
applications rely on various forms of 
weak AI. When surfing the Internet, 
AI programs run in an attempt to give 
you the best answers you are seeking. 
Some Internet search engines not only 
provide what you are looking for but 
also examine the personal aspects of 
the person asking. For instance, the 
Google web browser personalizes 
answers to requests based on “who” 
has asked, “from where” and at “what 
time”. In so doing, the AI running in 
the background of the search tends to 
match both the detailed knowledge of 
the searcher’s profile with the object of 
the search itself, which is undertaken 
to deliver the best possible answers 
to the searcher’s request. 
 However, what if you did not 
even have to look at your phone or a 
web browser to access the informa-
tion you need? What if all this informa-
tion was accessible from practically 
anywhere, anytime? Being surrounded 
by information anywhere and anytime 
as we move through our everyday lives 
and computers have disappeared 
into the background is the vision 
of a different computing paradigm 
known as “ubiquitous computing” or 
“ubicomp”. Imagine waking up to the 
sound of your alarm clock right on 
time for your morning appointment 
and with the smell of freshly brewed 
coffee. Your alarm clock had consulted 
your work schedule the night before 
and alerted the coffee machine to 
start preparing your morning coffee 
minutes before it went off. You glance 
out the window, and a display of the 
day’s forecast appears at the corner 
of your eye, blending in with the sight 
of the morning hustle and bustle of 
your street, calmly and seamlessly 
blending the real and the virtual.  This 
is the vision of ubiquitous computing, 
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also known as “smart computing”, 
“ambient intelligence”, or “the Internet 
of Things”. Although it first appeared 
in the late 1980s, it has lately gained 
considerable traction as both industry 
and policy makers  proclaim to have 
turned their attention to building a 
computationally enhanced future that 
focuses less on machines (intelligent 
or otherwise) than on people themsel-
ves. Ubiquitous computing promises 
to serve and support people by using 
numerous, ubiquitous, invisible 
machines embedded in environments 
and everyday objects, such as pens, 
books, watches, buildings, walls, 
furniture, and clothes.
 As Bill Gates (2003) puts it: “All this 
will lead to a fundamental change 
in the way we perceive computers. 
Using one will become like using 
electricity when you turn on a 
light. 
… We will be focused on what 
we can do with computers, not on the 
devices themselves. 
They will be all around us, 
essential to almost every part of 
our lives, but they will effectively 
have "disappeared"’. 
 Although it might be said that 
we still have a long way to go until 
such visions become reality, some 
commentators claim that we are 
already living in an ubicomp world. 
The ubiquity of smartphones in 
every aspect of our lives, whether 
personal or professional, might be 
understood as evidence that we are 
already immersed in a computatio-
nal experience that blends the virtual 
and the real. Even if your smartphone 
looks too much like an attention-
seeking computer to qualify as an 
“ubicomp experience”, some of the 
newest wearable smart devices might 
be more convincing.
*This future scenario is based on the scenario 
Mark Weiser used in his paper «The Computer for 
the Twenty-First Century,» Scientific American, 
pp. 94-10, September 1991, which introduced 
ubiquitous computing for the first time. 
  See, for example, http://www.microsoft.com/eu/
whats-next/article/ubiquitous-computing-ser-
ving-user-needs-anytime-anywhere.aspx
  In 2001, this vision of Ambient Intelligence was 
adopted by the European Commission’s Informa-
tion Society and Technology Advisory Group 
(ISTAG) as the main theme of the Sixth Framework 
(FP6) in Information, Society and Technology 
(IST) Research in Europe (ISTAG 2001), whereas 
in 2007, the European Research Cluster on the 
Internet of Things (IERC) was established. 
 
h t t p : / / w w w . m i c r o s o f t . c o m / p r e s s p a s s /
ofnote/11-02worldin2003.mspx.
 Devices such as “Google Glass” 
(smart eyewear that promises to 
provide information as and when we 
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need it) or “smart watches” (which 
track the wearer’s movements and 
monitor health and fitness) might give 
you a taste of an ubicomp experience. 
Furthermore, the experience does not 
stop there. For years now, industrial 
and academic centers have focused 
on developing smart living spaces 
that promise unprecedented levels of 
convenience, comfort and enjoyment.
 
These technologically 
controlled environments can 
monitor, control and manage 
many aspects of our everyday 
lives: from the health and general 
well-being of senior citizens to 
air and water quality, atmosphe-
ric conditions and our domestic 
energy consumption.
Of course, there are many 
more examples of how science and 
technology might modify people’s 
everyday lives. For instance, there are 
already prototypes of smart cars that 
can drive alone, which will make our 
travel safer. Similarly, brain-com-
puter interfaces, augmented reality 
glasses and robots can already 
assist in surgery or rescue people in 
dangerous situations. The potential is 
huge, but so are the possible pitfalls. 
Technologically enhancing 
our evolution?
Technologies developed by 
means of AI and ubicomp (i.e., 
smartphones, games, and/or other 
technologies that automatically 
regulate the temperature or lighting 
in our homes for our comfort) are 
marketed to us as a cool or even 
essential part of our everyday lives. 
Thus, in 2014, United States Supreme 
Court Chief Justice John Roberts was 
quoted as saying: “Modern cell phones 
are such a pervasive and insistent part 
of daily life that the proverbial visitor 
from Mars might conclude they were 
an important feature of the human 
anatomy ”.
 
* RILEY v. CALIFORNIA, 573 U. S. Opinion of the 
Court (2014):p.9.
Some are excited about the 
possibilities of introducing more 
technological tools that might 
enhance our everyday lives. Raymond 
Kurzweil – the well-known inventor, 
engineer and advocate for advancing 
and developing technology for human 
enhancement  – has predicted that:
 « By 2040, the non-biological part 
of our being will exceed by far 
our biological component and 
that there will be no difference 
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between human and machine or 
between physical and virtual 
reality (Kurzweil 2005). »
 Kurzweil has also explored 
ideas involving how artificial intelli-
gence can expand and enrich human 
capabilities; in particular, he sees the 
merging of humans with technolo-
gy as the only way in which humans 
can stay competitive in a world in 
which our machines are approaching 
human-like intelligence. However, 
not everyone is excited or optimistic 
about the possibilities of technolo-
gically enhancing ourselves. Hence, 
a discussion regarding the perils 
and implications of technological 
enhancement is necessary.
 There are voices from the fields 
of philosophy, the social sciences and 
the humanities that point to -
 a broad spectrum of ethical, 
social and political issues that 
must be carefully considered 
when thinking about science and 
technology and their relationship 
to society and humankind. 
These voices range from 
concerns revolving around the loss 
of autonomy and the subversion 
of free will to fears that technolo-
gy will somehow replace the human 
and therefore make humans less 
important and more dependent on 
technology. There are also concerns 
that delving deeply into the realm of 
AI is akin to playing God and thus not 
within the purview of humans and 
arguments that claim that science 
and technology should be addressed 
with neither fear nor awe because 
such responses assume that both 
fields are somehow external to and 
independent of society and culture. 
Instead, they should be examined 
as interdependent phenomena that 
shape one another. 
 Specifically, while science and 
technology rush forward, some raise 
social concerns regarding the access 
and equitable distribution of their 
benefits and how these factors will 
impact humanity. 
Unequal access to these techno-
logies might increase the global 
inequality gaps that divide nations 
and populations.
 In a world in which millions of 
people still do not have access to 
clean water, food and/or essential 
medicine, all-obliging intelli-
gent robots or smart kitchens that 
automatically order milk when it 
is running low appear superfluous 
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at best and irresponsible at worst. 
These social concerns are based on 
the view that science and technolo-
gy should serve society, address its 
problems and serve its needs rather 
than finance vanity projects that 
benefit or are affordable and relevant 
to only a very small fraction of the 
global population. 
 Others are concerned about 
the accompanying privacy and 
surveillance issues. 
For example, “Google Glasses” 
are now being used by many law 
enforcement agencies in pilot 
programs as tools to provide more 
security to the public. In its efforts to 
fight crime, the New York City Police 
Department has purchased several 
pairs of these glasses, which can call 
up both building schematics and a 
suspect’s criminal history, in addition 
to allowing law enforcement agencies 
to freely share information. However, 
how will the primary objective of 
enhancing public safety be balanced 
against possible violations of privacy 
and the readily accessible informa-
tion on individuals who may or may 
not be suspects? Whereas the latest 
smart technologies promise to track 
our every step to closely tailor their 
services and enhance our everyday 
lives in meaningful ways, there are 
questions regarding the use of such 
technologies to collect, manage and 
potentially abuse such large sets of 
data on private persons. 
 Whereas some are concerned 
with the consequences that new 
technological advances might have 
for society and human beings, others 
seek to examine the claims and 
promises that these new technologies 
make in the first place. For example, 
rather than taking for granted science 
and technology’s promises of a better 
future, it might be more important 
to begin by examining the following 
question: 
« How can we ensure that our 
technological advances accord 
with our values? « 
According to American ethicist 
Leon Kass, “the technological way of 
thinking has infected ethics, which 
is supposed to be thinking about the 
good”. Hence, when reviewing all the 
things that have been accomplished 
in conjunction with the envisioned 
promises and perils of technologies 
– such as AI or ubiquitous computing 
– there is a concern that we may have 
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become biased in our socio-ethical 
discussion. 
In other words, we might have 
forgotten what constitutes 
recognizable progress that 
results in a “good quality of life”. 
Ill-planned and poorly 
implemented technological advances 
can make us lose sight of what we 
value, such as having time to “really” 
interact with other humans (and not 
only online). 
They can also make us deplete 
natural resources as we continue to 
build an ever expanding infrastruc-
ture; they can even harm us in the 
pursuit of being better rather than 
being well, hence disregarding the 
importance of our human limitations.
 Moreover, others argue that 
it is not only the ethical implications 
that must be examined but also the 
politics underlying such visions. 
These voices call on us to consider 
not only the power relations that such 
visions (re)produce but also who gets 
included and who is excluded from 
these technological worlds.  Although 
humans have always attempted to 
draw boundaries, we must bear in 
mind that there are no pre-deter-
mined methods to determine where 
these boundaries could or should 
be drawn. Differences matter, and 
the ways in which boundaries are 
drawn – what constitutes a “natural”, 
a “technological”, a “contaminated”, 
or an “enhanced” human – remain 
questions that are worthy of constant 
examination and adjustment that 
must remain subject to persistent 
questioning and re-evaluation.
Thoughts for the future 
Scientific and technological 
advances must be examined and 
challenged and not simply be taken 
for granted as we allow ourselves to 
become carried away with the “next 
big thing”. They must be investigated 
repeatedly so that we can examine the 
power relations that these technolo-
gical advances produce or reproduce. 
Many questions might serve as a 
beginning for deep reflections. For 
instance, in a world in which millions 
of people remain without access 
to clean water, food or essential 
medicine, how does a digital gadget 
that detects your blood sugar help pay 
for the medicine you need but cannot 
afford or the dinner you have not 
eaten? What happens to all the people 
who somehow are not included in this 
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seemingly universal ‘we’? Moreover, 
are these advances genuinely 
concerned with ‘helping people’? With 
respect to all the rhetoric surrounding 
useful services, having information at 
our fingertips, and easy this and easy 
that, who actually benefits from this 
technology and what does it actually 
enable him or her to do or be? Who 
decides what the common good is, 
what the types of technologies are 
that we need or desire, and how we 
distinguish the technologies that are 
for the common good from those 
that serve only certain individuals, 
companies or governments? In 
attempting to answer such questions, 
we may reach a better understan-
ding of the type of world in which we 
would like to live. Rather than blindly 
following an individual’s selfish 
desires and radical techno-futu-
ristic visions of humanity, an open 
socio-ethical and political discussion 
regarding the use of science and the 
promises of technological advances is 
necessary to ensure the responsible, 
sustainable and ethical development 
of such technological visions. 
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« If we conclude that respecting God’s will means 
relinquishing all control over creation, we come 
into a conFLict with another prominent theistic 
notion: free will. Our bodies are as much as 
anything a part of God’s creation, yet here we are, 
apparently in charge of them. How is it possible 
that the concepts of divine providence and free 
will can co-exist? »
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Chapter 7
Playing with the “Playing God” 
Hossein Dabbagh and Elena Andreeva
«Anderson Cooper, CNN: “You’re saying doctors play God all 
the time?” 
Dr. Kevorkian : “Of course. Any time you interfere with 
a natural process, you’re playing God. God determines 
what happens naturally. That means that, when a per-
son is ill, he shouldn’t go to a doctor, because he’s 
asking for interference with God’s will.”
Modified from CNN transcripts, April 15th, 2010
Dr. Jack Kevorkian was a zealous 
activist for euthanasia. Beginning in 
1990, the infamous “Doctor Death” 
helped more than 100 people end 
their own lives by lethal injection. In an 
interview, when accused of “playing 
God”, Kevorkian retorted that he was 
as guilty as any other doctor, given 
that they also step into God’s shoes 
of determining destiny by interfering 
with the natural processes of the 
human body.
 Not everyone goes as far as 
Kevorkian in claiming that all medical 
interventions count as “playing God.” 
This charge is more commonly leveled 
against practices such as capital 
punishment and abortion, in addition 
to in vitro fertilization more recently, 
pre-natal screening and genetic 
engineering. The common denomina-
tor among these issues is that they all 
concern something for which personal 
responsibility is not easily taken; they 
all concern something that is conside-
red so serious that we would rather 
pass the care and the blame on to God 
– or to fate or to chance – rather than 
face the responsibility for it ourselves, 
and they concern something that has 
been traditionally placed in the realm 
of the sacred: human life.
Destruction of human life, crea-
tion of human life, modification 
of human life from its original 
form – dare we take these things 
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into our own hands? Do we have 
the right to do so? 
Human enhancement, as a 
prime example of this final category, 
naturally raises the same concerns. 
Already we taunt fate when we decide 
– as part of the accepted procedure 
of in vitro fertilization – which of our 
embryos will go on to become life 
– those with two X chromosomes 
or those with a Y chromosome. In 
addition, as our skills in genetic 
engineering grow more refined, we 
may soon see:
 “the advent of designer babies”, 
whose lot in life with respect to 
attractiveness and intelligence 
will be cast not by Fate but by their 
parents in choosing their genes.
 We have never been as close 
to treading on this “forbidden soil” 
of the gods as we are today; that 
much is clear. If there was ever a 
time to heed the legend of Icarus, 
today is the day. Theologians and 
philosophers alike issue warnings 
against our growing obsession 
with self-enhancement. Domenico 
Mogavero, Bishop of Mazara del Vallo, 
has denounced the modification of 
creation from its original design as 
an “enormous risk” that threatens 
to make humans barbarians. "In the 
wrong hands, today's development 
can lead tomorrow to a devastating 
leap in the dark".  In the same vein, 
Harvard’s Michael Sandel (2007) and 
Ronald Dworkin (2002) have noted 
that, by being perpetually dissatisfied 
with the natures that we have been 
given, we fail to appreciate the beauty 
of our imperfections; thus, in striving 
to reach some imagined ideal by any 
means, we risk destroying the very 
traits that make us human. 
 These thinkers may very well 
have some valid points. However, one 
question must be raised. How certain 
are we, really, that we are indeed 
“playing God” when we take a more 
active role in determining our bodies’ 
physical fates? What type of evidence 
is such an assumption based? Is there 
a theological foundation for it?
 
Within the three main Abraha-
mic religions (Judaism, Islam and 
Christianity), divine providence is 
a prominent theological concept. 
Unlike Isaac Newton, who saw 
God as a “retired architect”, these 
three theistic traditions reject the 
idea that God abandoned the universe 
upon its creation. Instead, as with 
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René Descartes, who needed God to 
account for time, theists from these 
three main Abrahamic religions 
assert that God continuously protects, 
guides, preserves and takes care of 
His world. In addition, if God chooses 
to take an active interest in His 
creation, who are we to contest Him 
for maintaining control over it? Dare 
we claim that the manner in which God 
made us is not good enough and that, 
despite His care and involvement, we 
nevertheless would like to “play” His 
role, taking it upon ourselves to tidy 
up God’s mistakes and make a few 
much-needed upgrades to our bodies 
and/or minds? 
 Perhaps, out of full respect for 
Providence, we should abandon all 
attempts to meddle with creation. 
Perhaps all doctors should go out of 
business as we stay home to let nature 
take its course. Is this the outcome to 
which Abrahamic theology leads us? If 
we conclude that respecting God’s will 
means relinquishing all control over 
creation, we come into a conflict with 
another prominent theistic notion: 
free will. Our bodies are as much as 
anything a part of God’s creation, yet 
here we are, apparently in charge of 
them (and even held responsible for 
wielding them for good over evil!). 
How is it possible that the concepts 
of divine providence and free will can 
co-exist? 
 
One solution is to assume that 
free will is itself a part of God’s 
plan, that the Creator chooses, 
as it were, to be the One relinqui-
shing control: control over the 
conscious part of His creation to 
give them the power to choose 
And, as a consequence, be held 
responsible for choices that they 
make. If that is the case, then why 
not imagine that God and humans 
can work together in parallel with one 
another, making us, in the words of the 
Australian philosopher C. A. J. Coady, 
“co-workers with God” (2009, 156)? 
For instance, God might have created 
different forests and lakes, but if 
humans plant more trees and/or dig 
artificial lakes, would they necessarily 
be interfering with His plan? We might 
pray to God for healing from disease, 
but does this mean that we are not 
allowed to pursue a career in medicine 
or research? In both Christian and 
Islamic culture and traditions, we find 
sayings such as “Man proposes, God 
disposes” and “God helps those who 
help themselves”. Theology actively 
urges human beings to go, find, and 
create what is hidden and unfolding 
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in God’s providential plan. According 
to this perspective, we are not playing 
God in the sense of taking on the role 
of God; 
instead, God allows us to play 
together with Him, within His uni-
verse.
 
What does theistic theology tell 
us about the exact nature of our 
joint work with God? 
In the Koran
It is written: “Just recall the time 
when your Lord said to the angels: ‘I 
am going to appoint a vicegerent on 
the Earth’" (1:30). Such a vicegerent 
– or Khalifah – as it is interpreted, 
means one who exercises delegated 
powers on behalf of another. As 
Khalifah, a human is therefore not 
the master himself but an agent of his 
Master, Allah. According to Islamic 
tradition, human beings thus do not 
have the right to their own will but are 
in this world to fulfill the will of the 
delegating Authority, Allah. 
The Bible 
The Bibble offers insights from 
a different angle: “So God created 
mankind in His own image, in the 
image of God He created them; 
male and female He created them” 
(Genesis 1:27). An image, although 
with a fundamentally different nature 
from the object it depicts, neverthe-
less captures and expresses all its 
characteristics. Thus, Christianity 
teaches that human beings have 
been created with the potential to 
express the qualities and skills of 
their Creator, including the skill of 
creation itself.  Whether a poem, a 
painting, a symphony, or simply the 
choice between right and wrong, a 
person endowed with free will should 
have the capacity to impact the future 
in an unprecedented manner (i.e., to 
create something truly original).
 However, theistic theology 
emphasizes one fundamental dis-
tinction between our creative ca-
pacity and God’s. 
As an uncaused Cause of 
everything that exists, God creates 
ex nihilo – out of nothing. The Koran 
states, “His command is only when He 
intends a thing that He says to it, ‘Be,’ 
and it is” (36:82). The Bible implies the 
same idea: “By the word of the Lord 
were the heavens made, their starry 
host by the breath of His mouth” 
(Psalms 33:6). Ex nihilo creation 
remains beyond human reach. As 
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part of the created material universe, 
we are subject to its physical laws, 
including the law of the conserva-
tion of energy. As long as that law 
holds, we cannot make the objects 
of our desire materialize out of thin 
air without exerting some energy 
to procure them first. In addition, 
although our ideas may be completely 
original, they will nevertheless always 
remain a product of the pre-existing 
neural web of our brains. Thus, the 
fear of encroaching upon God’s realm 
can be safely put to rest: even if we 
wanted to and dared take on His role, 
we could never overcome our a priori 
basic limitations.
 However, within the material 
world, God has given us freedom 
to be original, theists claim. Why, 
then, should we be afraid to create 
something “unnatural”?
 Would God actually object if we 
used our knowledge of gene-
tic engineering to make a striped 
white-and-purple petunia plant?... 
...which may very well have 
never evolved as such on its own,  or 
to reducing drastic food shortages in 
the developing world by giving crops 
“artificial” pest-resistant genes, or to 
relieving the symptoms of Parkinson’s 
disease and major depression by 
implanting platinum electrodes into 
the human brain? To not make full 
use of our skills in the face of the 
challenges confronting our century 
would be akin to resigning to death on 
a sinking ship by refusing to fix a leak. 
One needs only to recall the Parable 
of the Talents to know what Jesus 
Christ thought of such an attitude. 
 However, as with all good 
intentions, the human condition – 
or simply, our thoughtlessness and 
greed – persistently obstruct our way. 
As technology develops, our power 
to tap the planet’s resources grows; 
however, we do not simply tap but 
use a sledgehammer instead. We 
know that the havoc wreaked by our 
insatiable consumption is wreaking 
havoc, in turn, on the environment. 
However, we continue importing, 
jet-setting and eating meat from 
our factory farms. If we were indeed 
fashioned by a loving Creator, could 
this relationship genuinely be the 
relationship between humankind 
and the rest of His creation that He 
envisioned? 
 Genesis 2:15 describes the 
intended relationship in the following: 
“And the Lord took the man, and put 
him into the Garden of Eden to work 
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it and to keep it.” What do the tasks 
of “working” and “keeping” imply? 
In the first five books of the Bible’s 
Old Testament (Genesis, Exodus, 
Leviticus, Numbers, and Deutero-
nomy, collectively known as the Torah 
in Judaism), the only other instances 
in which the Hebrew words for “work” 
and “keep” are used are in reference 
to the duties ascribed to priests in 
watching over their temple (Numbers 
3:5-7). Jewish scholars note the 
pervading parallels between the story 
of creation in the Book of Genesis and 
the construction of this temple – the 
tabernacle – in the Book of Exodus. 
By instructing human beings to “work 
and keep” the garden, God is, in 
fact, entrusting us with the roles of 
priests – and our temple is the rest of 
creation.
 The Islamic and Christian 
traditions teach that, as priests, 
human beings are meant to bless 
and sanctify creation, not to abuse, 
dishonor, or exploit it. We are meant to 
treat creation with deep appreciation 
for the fullness of its intrinsic value as 
the work of God’s hands. The human 
body, as part of creation, deserves to 
be treated with the same reverence, 
and all the more so. New Testament 
language repeatedly refers to the 
body as the temple of the Holy Spirit 
(1 Corinthians 3:16-17). The Apostle 
Paul teaches that, when we become 
members of the Christian Church, our 
bodies become members of a single 
body – the body of Christ – and as 
such, the dwelling place for the Spirit 
of God (Ephesians 2:19-22). Muslim 
jurists and mystics frequently refer to 
Prophetic sayings and Koranic verses, 
such as “Surely we belong to Allah 
and to Him we shall return” (1:156), to 
insist that people are able to become 
God’s hands, eyes or ears in this 
world.  Therefore, human beings are 
understood as intrinsically holy. 
 As the possibility of enhancing 
the human body through biotechno-
logy becomes increasingly real, the 
“playing God” allegation will inevitably 
be raised repeatedly. Human life is 
valued deeply by both believers and 
non-believers alike, and given the 
history of our careless technologi-
cal trampling of planet Earth, the 
concern is both understandable and 
pertinent. However, as argued above, 
there is not much theological basis 
on which to rest such a claim. The 
human capacity for creation cannot 
be placed on the same plane as 
God’s creative capacity; to consider 
ourselves capable of encroaching 
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upon His domain is a testament to 
our deep-seated arrogance. However, 
religious traditions and texts affirm 
that, within the creative capacity that 
we do have – 
having been made in God’s image 
and having been granted free will 
– we are encouraged by God to use 
all our talents to improve our li-
ves. 
When searching for the 
appropriate limits in our quest for 
improvement, however, we should 
consider the centuries-old wisdom 
of the Abrahamic religious traditions 
and take a page out of the Koran, the 
Torah, and the Bible as we strive to 
approach the task of human enhance-
ment with due reverence and respect.
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« Individuals who do not use different types of 
human enhancement may fInd themselves at a 
disadvantage within a society that values a level of 
performance that may otherwise be unattainable. »  
« (...)Altering or choosing human traits is inappro-
priate, not because it changes who we are but 
because, due to a “lack of imagination”, everyone 
might choose the same type of enhancement, 
creating less diverse societies. »
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Chapter 8
Be the best version of yourself: How 
individual enhancements can cause 
social change
Cynthia Forlini, PhD1 and Tugce Bilgin2
1. The University of Queensland Centre for Clinical Research, The University of 
Queensland / 2. The University of Zurich
Discussions regarding the social 
outcomes of human enhancement 
frequently evoke images of bionic 
humans and Brave New World utopias 
in which individuals perform at the top 
of their physical and mental capacities. 
Whether the enhancements are 
biological, physical, cognitive or 
behavioral, they are meant to improve 
“some capacity (or characteristic) 
that normal human beings ordinarily 
have” and may even produce new 
capabilities (Buchanan 2010). For 
proponents of human enhancement, 
this change represents the essence of 
what it means to advance and flourish 
as human beings. However, for critics 
of enhancement, it represents the 
erosion of human nature. Both of 
these perspectives adhere to ideals 
of human performance that define 
a “good life” (Roduit, Baumann, and 
Heilinger 2013). Human enhancement 
can be regarded as an integral part of 
a good life and as an opportunity for 
individuals to be the best versions of 
themselves, but it may simultaneously 
be regarded as a disruption in the 
fabric of society. In one manner of 
speaking, human enhancement 
represents both of these facets. In 
this chapter, we explore:
 «How seeking biomedical enhance-
ments to be the best version of 
oneself impacts individuals and 
society.»
We discuss the example of how 
changes in society may be shifting the 
goals of medicine from treating illness 
and dysfunction toward “wishfulfillment”.
81
Enhancing individuals
When broadly considered, 
enhancements appear pervasive in 
human activity. Corrective eyewear, 
immunization, modifications to the 
human genome and psychophar-
macology all fall under the heading 
of biomedical enhancement (Harris 
2007). These biomedical innovations 
were achieved by means of literacy, 
numeracy, and science, which are 
types of enhancements in human 
activity in and of themselves 
(Buchanan 2010). For this reason, it is 
frequently argued that
 “human history – or at least human 
progress – is in great part the story 
of enhancement” (Buchanan 2010). 
It is understandable – and 
perhaps even expected – that humans 
continue to seek, create and use 
enhancements to produce “healthier, 
longer-lived, and altogether ‘better’ 
individuals” (Harris 2007). If enhance-
ment is an integral part of human 
activity and enhanced individuals can 
lead rich lives and meet their goals, 
why is there opposition to it? The 
opposition hinges on the perception 
of whether an enhanced individual 
is authentic compared with the 
un-enhanced or “natural” individual.
Distinctions have been made in 
the ways authenticity can be 
understood. 
Authenticity can be based on: 
(1) what is valuable to an individual 
(“wholeheartedness”); (2) honesty and 
autonomy in the choices one makes; 
and (3) a “true self” that, to a certain 
extent, consists of natural gifts (Erler 
2011). Critics of human enhance-
ment mainly take issue with the 
manner in which enhancement might 
modify one’s natural gifts. By using 
enhancements to confer capabili-
ties that one might not otherwise 
possess, an individual bypasses the 
discipline and effort that is expected to 
achieve excellence, promote human 
flourishing and establish identity 
(Kass 2003). 
In particular, the concerns over 
authenticity relate to genetic 
manipulations that enhance 
cognitive performance and mood 
because these traits are conside-
red fundamental to personal 
identity. 
Indeed, enhancement of these 
traits evokes the most stringent 
moral objections (Riis, Simmons, and 
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Goodwin 2008). Conversely, it has 
been argued that “[t]o be authentic 
is to find one’s way in life and one’s 
values within; it is to make one’s 
entire life an expression of who one 
truly is” (Levy 2007). Enhancement 
can be one way of pursuing a desired 
trait and ultimately self-actualizing, 
whether by changing one’s disposition 
or reaching a certain performance 
level (Kramer 1997). The trait remains 
authentic and the means appropriate 
provided that the choice is motivated 
by self-creation, based on the 
individual’s values and self-concep-
tion, and does not distort one’s view of 
the world (DeGrazia 2000; Dees 2007). 
Through enhancement, individuals 
can have the opportunity to be the best 
versions of their true selves without 
changing who they fundamentally are.
If the opportunity to be the best 
version of yourself exists, does it 
mean that you must take it? At this 
point, using enhancement technology 
is considered voluntary self-impro-
vement (Caplan 2003). Research has 
shown that the public accepts that 
individuals make personal choices 
(within the limits of the law) when 
deciding to use a biomedical enhance-
ment that they consider necessa-
ry to achieve their goals ( Forlini 
and Racine 2009; Fitz et al. 2014;). 
Similarly, abstaining from enhance-
ment should also be considered an 
acceptable personal choice. Although 
the ideals of human performance 
are already the subject of the ethical 
debate, the fear is that these ideals, 
particularly for proponents of human 
enhancement, will lead to -
 «an expectation and even pressure 
to use enhancements in perfor-
mance-based communities, 
cultures, and workplaces ( Racine 
and Forlini 2009; Heilinger and 
Crone 2014). 
Although individuals might 
not necessarily be obligated to use 
a biomedical enhancement, they 
might feel that they should do so to 
compete and meet social, cultural or 
professional expectations (Forlini and 
Racine 2009). When enhancement 
is motivated by external pressures, 
it may no longer be considered an 
authentic act because it constitutes 
conformity rather than self-actuali-
zation. Freedom from coercion with 
respect to human enhancement is 
precious common ground for those on 
opposite sides of the ethical spectrum 
because such freedom preserves 
authenticity.
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Would enhanced individuals 
make a better society ?
 
The previous section explored 
human enhancement from the 
perspective of the individual. 
Individuals have the potential to 
optimize performance and the 
freedom to choose to do so, a choice 
that may ultimately be colored 
by novel ideals regarding human 
performance. However, the opposite 
may also occur. Whitehouse and 
colleagues hypothesize that 
“we cannot change ourselves 
without disturbing that larger 
web of identities”, which means 
that “personality changes are by 
necessity a community event and 
should be undertaken as such” 
(Whitehouse et al. 1997). 
These authors warn that, 
cumulatively, individual decisions 
may become social decisions. How, 
then, might individual decisions 
regarding individual enhancement 
affect society? 
One might reasonably argue that 
the cumulative effect of enhanced 
individuals on society is necessa-
rily positive. Human enhancement 
empowers individuals by giving them 
the freedom to practice self-deter-
mination to (1) be the best and most 
authentic versions of themselves and 
(2) overcome physical or cognitive 
constraints that may limit their 
participation in society (Heilinger and 
Crone 2014). Enhancement reduces 
suffering for individuals who are 
unsatisfied or limited by their situation 
and improves their quality of life 
(Caplan 2003; Harris 2007; Buchanan 
2010). It is for this reason that 
proponents of enhancement consider 
the more conservative perspectives to 
be limited and short-sighted:
“conservatives who oppose the 
use of biological, internal technolo-
gical, and other private enhance-
ments are guilty of a crude form 
of social determinism, predicting 
some adverse social consequence 
of allowing enhancement when it is 
within our power to prevent these 
adverse social consequences and 
reduce inequality” (Savulescu 2006). 
By permitting and encouraging 
enhancement, societies would 
promote equality of opportunity 
and level the playing field for all 
its members (Savulescu 2006). 
Society is not necessarily a 
zero-sum scenario  in which one 
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individual’s gain is another’s loss 
(Buchanan 2010). Instead, enhanced 
individuals would contribute talents 
and skills to create a better society 
overall. 
There are some negative effects 
that may arise from widespread 
biomedical enhancement. Human 
enhancements that meddle in the 
natural lottery “represent a kind 
of hyperagency – a Promethean 
aspiration to remake nature … to serve 
our purposes and satisfy our desires” 
(Sandel 2004). Humans can innovate 
but would overstep their bounds 
by engineering the natural lottery. 
Biomedical enhancements run the 
“danger of violating or deforming 
the nature of human agency and the 
dignity of the naturally human way 
of activity” (President's Council on 
Bioethics 2003). This perspective 
does not consider enhancement to be 
a valid mode of self-actualization. 
Self-actualization is supposed 
to be achieved through effort 
and hard work. Anything else is 
cheating and unethical. 
Individuals who do not use 
different types of human enhance-
ment may find themselves at a 
disadvantage within a society that 
values a level of performance that 
may otherwise be unattainable. 
Another possible consequence may 
be for enhancement to breed extreme 
equality. Kamm argues that altering 
or choosing human traits is inappro-
priate, not because it changes who 
we are but because, due to a “lack 
of imagination”, everyone might 
choose the same type of enhance-
ment, creating less diverse societies 
(Kamm 2005). Whether positive or 
negative effects manifest in society 
as the result of human enhancement 
depends on how individuals exercise 
their freedom to engage in or abstain 
from enhancement.
Using medicine for an en-
hanced society
Technologies used for biomedi-
cal enhancement are couched in a 
medical context. From prostheses to 
pharmacology to types of neuro-sti-
mulation, much of what we now 
refer to as enhancements have 
evolved from medical treatments. 
Enhancement and medicine seem 
so tightly intertwined that it has 
been suggested that “saying no to 
biomedical enhancement isn’t really 
an option— unless we want to stop 
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medical progress” (Buchanan 2010). 
Whereas the means may develop in 
tandem, treatments and enhance-
ments serve different ends. These 
terms are frequently used in an 
oppositional and exclusive manner 
such that a so-called enhancement is 
“designed to produce improvements 
in human form or function that do not 
respond to legitimate medical needs” 
(Juengst 1998). 
From this DEFInition, it seems 
simple to untangle enhancement 
from treatment. In practice, this 
distinction is more difficult. 
For example, although professio-
nal guidance from the American 
Association of Clinical Endocrinolo-
gists clearly states that there is no 
evidence to support the use of human 
growth hormone for anti-aging or to 
enhance athletic performance, these 
two uses still account for approxima-
tely 30% of all prescriptions (Cook et 
al. 2009). This figure suggests that the 
drive to be at one’s very best using 
enhancement is prompting society, 
and with it medicine, to reconsi-
der what it means to be healthy and 
functional. 
Individuals seeking to be the best 
versions of themselves may perceive 
dysfunction and a remedy where 
medicine does not. 
From the medical perspective, 
enhancement leads to major 
concerns over (1) the expanding 
spectrum of medical needs and (2) 
the ends these needs serve. 
The first worry is related to the 
process of “medicalization” (Conrad 
and Gabe 1999; Mbongue et al. 
2005). Medicalization turns “natural 
expressions of human behavior into 
a ‘disease’ that requires – or would 
benefit from – drug treatment” 
(Flower 2004). At one extreme, 
medicalization has been associated 
with “disease mongering” (Moynihan, 
Heath, and Henry 2002) or a “diagnos-
tic bracket creep” (Kramer 1997), i.e., 
a way of growing drug markets to sell 
and deliver treatments by creating 
new medical conditions. Thus, certain 
levels of human performance that, to 
date, have not been part of a diagnosis 
might become the target of treatment 
with medications based on redefined 
notions of normal human function – 
and dysfunction. Conversely, some 
also believe that medicalization has 
improved health over the years (Farah 
et al. 2004). The development of oral 
contraceptives, i.e., drugs that do 
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not cure but prevent, has positively 
impacted family planning. Nonethe-
less, oral contraceptives are far from 
being considered human enhance-
ment, and by no means would a 
woman taking them be considered 
inauthentic. The picture becomes less 
clear when other types of medicaliza-
tion are considered. The increased 
non-medical use of prescription 
stimulants among university students 
has sparked - 
« a debate regarding whether more 
students have attention deficits 
or whether academic perfor-
mance standards are too difficult 
to attain without medication 
(Rabiner et al. 2009).
 Aging populations have a host 
of products available to them to stave 
off age-related cognitive and physical 
decline, allowing them to age more 
actively and productively (George and 
Whitehouse 2011; Fries 2014) These 
two areas are examples of how the 
confusion between treatment and 
enhancement can make certain types 
of human activity prone to medicali-
zation.
Serving social purposes or 
functions through medicine is the 
second major worry. 
Sadler and colleagues argue 
that medicalization “may represent a 
broad range of human interests and 
values, as well as serve one or more 
social purposes or functions” (Sadler 
et al. 2009). Indeed, changing the 
ideals of performance would qualify 
within these interests and social 
purposes, and certain examples of 
medicine serving society already 
exist. Parallels have been drawn 
between cognitive enhancement and 
cosmetic surgery, a procedure that 
can be used as a treatment for some 
and the fulfillment of a non-medical 
wish to have a certain appearance 
for others (Chatterjee 2004). These 
types of interventions have been 
grouped together as “wish-fulfilling 
medicine” (Buyx 2008; Asscher, Bolt, 
and Schermer 2012), with “doctors 
and other health professionals using 
medical means (medical technolo-
gy, drugs, etc.) in a medical setting 
to fulfill the explicitly stated, prima 
facie non-medical wish of a patient” 
(Buyx 2008). There are two significant 
concerns regarding the emergence 
of the uses of medical technology 
for enhancement. The first is that 
wish-fulfilling medicine, particu-
larly in the treatment of so-called 
lifestyle illnesses (e.g., obesity and 
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smoking-related illnesses), “remove 
responsibility or control from the 
individual or society” (Gilbert, Walley, 
and New 2000). From this perspec-
tive, the use of enhancements can 
be a detriment to strategies that 
promote different aspects of public 
health because lifestyle choices 
would not pose the health hazard they 
once did. Becoming the best version 
of oneself represents a high level 
of human agency, but the medicali-
zation of some aspects of a person 
may discount this agency, which is 
uniquely human.
Physicians are in a difficult position 
at the crossroads of treatment 
and enhancement. 
Simply because physicians “play 
a de facto role” in gatekeeping the 
technologies used for enhancement 
does not mean that this is the role 
they should be playing (Asscher, Bolt, 
and Schermer 2012). Some authors 
have argued that:
« It is inappropriate for the medical 
profession to correct social 
injustices by helping individuals 
meet academic or professional 
performance expectations with 
enhancement technologies. » 
(Dees 2004; Forlini, Gauthier, and 
Racine 2013).  
However, recent guidance from 
the American Academy of Neurology 
(AAN) gives physicians a wide berth 
in deciding whether to grant patient 
requests for neuroenhancement 
(Larriviere et al. 2009). According to 
the AAN, neurologists are neither 
ethically obligated nor forbidden from 
prescribing medications for purposes 
of enhancement, which suggests that 
medicine is moving toward serving 
social purposes.
Whether human enhancement 
continues to influence medicine and 
other social institutions depends on 
the decisions of individuals. Many 
predict that widespread human 
enhancement is inevitable, but as 
long as humans are agents of free 
will, enhancement remains a choice. 
Medical technologies may make 
enhancement possible but do not 
necessarily mean that enhancement 
should be undertaken. Individuals 
and societies must continue to 
examine the appropriateness and 
ethics of using medical technology for 
individual enhancement to properly 
evaluate the potential outcomes. 
References
Asscher, Eva C.A., and Maartje Schermer. 2012. 
“Wish-Fulfilling Medicine in Practice: a Qualita-
tive Study of Physician Arguments.” Journal of 
88
Medical Ethics 38 (6): 327-31. 
Buchanan, Allen. 2010. Better Than Human: the 
Promise and Perils of Enhancing Ourselves. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buyx, Alena M. 2008. “Be Careful What You 
Wish For? Theoretical and Ethical Aspects of 
Wish-Fulfilling Medicine.” Medicine, Health Care, 
& Philosophy 11 (2): 133-43.
Caplan, Arthur L. 2003. “Is Better Best? A Noted 
Ethicist Argues in Favor of Brain Enhancement.” 
Scientific American 289 (3): 104-5.
Chatterjee, Anjan. 2004. “Cosmetic Neurolo-
gy: the Controversy over Enhancing Movement, 
Mentation, and Mood.” Neurology 63 (6): 968-74.
Conrad, Peter and Jonathan Gabe. 1999. 
“Introduction: Sociological Perspectives on the 
New Genetics: an Overview.” Sociology of Health 
& Illness 21 (5): 505-16.
Cook, David, Kevin Yuen, Beverly Biller, Stephen 
Kemp, and Mary Vance. 2009. “American 
Association of Clinical Endocrinologists Medical 
Guidelines for Clinical Practice for Growth 
Hormone Use in Growth Hormone-Deficient 
Adults and Transition Patients - 2009 Update.” 
Endocrine Practice 15(Supplement 2): 1-29. 
Dees, Richard H. 2004. “Slippery Slopes, Wonder 
Drugs, and Cosmetic Neurology: the Neuroethics 
of Enhancement.” Neurology 63 (6): 951-2.
Dees, Richard H. 2007. “Better Brains, Better 
Selves? The Ethics of Neuroenhancements.” 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17 (4): 371-95.
DeGrazia, David. 2000. “Prozac, Enhancement, 
and Self-Creation.” Hastings Center Report 30 
(2): 34-40.
Erler, Alexandre. 2011. “Does Memory Modifica-
tion Threaten Our Authenticity?.” Neuroethics 4 
(3): 235-49.
Farah, Martha J., Judy Illes, Robert Cook-Dee-
gan, Howard Gardner, Eric Kandel, Patricia King, 
and Eric Parens, Barbara Sahakian, and Paul 
Root Wolpe. 2004. “Neurocognitive Enhance-
ment: What Can We Do and What Should We 
Do?.” Nature Reviews. Neuroscience 5 (5): 421-5.
Fitz, Nicholas S., Roland Nadler, Praveena 
Manogaran, Eugene W.J. Chong, and Peter B. 
Reiner. 2014. “Public Attitudes Toward Cognitive 
Enhancement.” Neuroethics 7 (2): 173–88.
Flower, Rod. 2004. “Lifestyle Drugs: Pharmacolo-
gy and the Social Agenda.” Trends in Pharmaco-
logical Sciences 25 (4): 182-5.
Forlini, Cynthia, Serge Gauthier, and Eric Racine. 
2013. “Should Physicians Prescribe Cognitive 
Enhancers to Healthy Individuals?.” Canadian 
Medical Association Journal 185 (12): 1047-50.
Forlini, Cynthia and Eric Racine. 2009. “Autonomy 
and Coercion in Academic “Cognitive Enhance-
ment” Using Methylphenidate: Perspectives of 
Key Stakeholders.” Neuroethics 2 (3) :163-77
Fries, Christopher J. 2014. “Older Adults’ Use 
of Complementary and Alternative Medical 
Therapies to Resist Biomedicalization of Aging.” 
Journal of Aging Studies 28: 1-10.
George, Daniel R. and Peter J. Whitehouse. 2011. 
“Marketplace of Memory: What the Brain Fitness 
Technology Industry Says about Us and How We 
Can do Better.” Gerontologist 51 (5): 590-6.
President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond 
Therapy. Washington, DC: President’s Council on 
Bioethics/Harper Collins.
Gilbert, David, Tom Walley, and Bill New. 2000. 
“Lifestyle Medicines.” British Medical Journal 
321 (7272): 1341-4.
Harris, John. 2007. Enhancing Evolution: the 
Ethical Case for Making People Better. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Heilinger, Jan-Christoph and Katja Crone. 2014. 
“Human Freedom and Enhancement.” Medicine, 
Health Care, & Philosophy 17(1):13-21.
89
Juengst, Eric. 1998. “What Does Enhancement 
Mean?.” In Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical 
and Social Implications, ed. Erik Parens, 29-47. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univerity Press.
Kamm, Frances M. 2005. “Is There a Problem with 
Enhancement?” American Journal of Bioethics 5 
(3): 5-14.
Kass, Leon R. 2003. “Ageless Bodies, Happy 
Souls.” The New Atlantis 1 (Spring): 9-28.
Kramer, Peter D. 1997. Listening to Prozac. 
London: Penguin Books.
Larriviere, Dan, Michael A. Williams, Matt Rizzo, 
and Richard J. Bonnie. 2009. “Responding to 
Requests from Adult Patients for Neuroen-
hancements: Guidance of the Ethics, Law and 
Humanities Committee.” Neurology 73 (17): 
1406-12.
Levy, Neil. 2007. Neuroethics: Challenges for the 
21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Mbongue, T.B. Ngoundo, A. Sommet, A. Pathak, 
and J.L. Montastruc. 2005. ““Medicamentation” 
of Society, Non-Diseases and Non-Medications: 
a Point of View from Social Pharmacology.”Eu-
ropean Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 61 (4): 
309-13.
Moynihan, Ray, Iona Heath, and David Henry. 
2002. “Selling Sickness: the Pharmaceutical 
Industry and Disease Mongering.” British Medical 
Journal 324 (7342): 886-891.
Rabiner, David L., Arthur D. Anastopoulos, E. Jane 
Costello, Rick H. Hoyle, Sean Esteban McCabe, 
and H.  Scott Swartzwelder. 2009. “Motives and 
Perceived Consequences of Nonmedical ADHD 
Medication Use by College Students: Are Students 
Treating Themselves for Attention Problems?” 
Journal of Attention Disorders 13 (3): 259-70.
Racine, Eric and Cynthia Forlini. 2009. “Expecta-
tions regarding Cognitive Enhancement Create 
Substantial Challenges.” Journal of Medical 
Ethics 35 (8): 469-70.
Riis, Jason, Joseph P. Simmons, and Geoffrey P. 
Goodwin. 2008. “Preferences for Enhancement 
Pharmaceuticals: the Reluctance to Enhance 
Fundamental Traits.” Journal of Consumer 
Research 35 (3): 495-508.
Roduit, Johann A.R., Holger Baumann, and 
Jan-Christoph Heilinger. 2013. “Human Enhance-
ment and Perfection.” Journal of Medical Ethics 
39 (10): 647-50.
Sadler, John Z., Fabrice Jotterand, Simon 
Craddock Lee, and Stephen Inrig. 2009. “Can 
Medicalization Be Good? Situating Medicaliza-
tion within Bioethics.” Theoretical Medicine & 
Bioethics 30 (6): 411-25.
Sandel, Michael J. 2004. “The Case against 
Perfection: What’s Wrong with Designer 
Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Enginee-
ring.” Atlantic Monthly 292 (3): 50–4, 56.
Savulescu, Julian. 2006. “Justice, Fairness, and 
Enhancement.” Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences 1093: 321-38.
Whitehouse, Peter J., Eric T. Juengst, Maxwell 
Mehlman, and Thomas H. Murray. 1997. 
“Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact.” 
Hastings Center Report 27 (3): 14-22.
 
90
« With the increasing number and performance 
of instruments related to brain imaging techno-
logies (e.g., EEG, fMRI), there is a growing risk that 
the protection of one’s private life and personal 
information will be challenged. »
« Further tangible future applications include 
adapting advertisements to consumers’ preferences 
after reading their minds and gaining access to 
and taking advantage of health data and intimate 
thoughts.»
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Chapter 9
Crossing mind barriers 
A precautionary approach to 
neuroenhancement strategies 
Charles Dupras*, Linda Jäger, Nakita Frater, Despoina Goniotaki
«Man is not going to wait passively for millions of years be-
fore evolution offers him a better brain. (Cornelius E. Giur-
gea”)»
Scientific research on the 
brain has traditionally incorporated 
biochemical, electrophysiological and 
psychological methods to discern the 
molecular, electrical and behavio-
ral bases of the brain’s function. 
The main goal was – and remains 
– to understand brain physiolo-
gy and pathology to prevent or treat 
diseases. To that end, a wide range of 
pharmaceutical drugs, brain stimula-
tion technologies and even gene 
technologies have been developed. 
Ultimately, it is predicted that the 
applications developed from such 
technologies may extend well 
beyond therapy and participate in 
human neuroenhancement. 
In a futuristic perspective, 
some of the novel brain interven-
tions developed in recent decades 
might even result in the enginee-
ring of “super-brains” that might, for 
example, possess pseudo-telepathic 
powers to remotely control machines 
or other humans. Thus, the cognitive 
abilities of our brains are a central 
preoccupation of “transhumanism” a 
concept coined by the biologist Julian 
Huxley in 1957 that describes how 
human capacities might be extended 
beyond what would be considered 
the “normal functioning” of body 
and mind (Bostrom 2005). Although 
such a scenario today resembles a 
view of the future in a science fiction 
novel, the potential of using emerging 
technologies to enhance human 
beings has already raised a panoply 
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of concerns that stimulated scientific 
and socio-ethical debates. 
The first part of this chapter 
explores traditional and modern 
strategies that enhance our cognition 
and our psychology (which we refer 
to as “neuroenhancement”) and that 
range from substances as common 
as coffee to today’s “smart drugs”, 
brain stimulation technologies and 
genetic or epigenetic engineering. The 
second part of this chapter consists 
of a discussion of the risk-benefit 
perspective of neuroenhancement, 
with an emphasis on why implemen-
ting such innovations in our society 
can be ethically sensitive.
Drugs as enhancers
It seems that human beings 
have always searched for ways 
to render themselves “better” 
and “smarter”. Broad-spectrum 
plant-derived natural compounds 
for increasing neuro-functioning – 
such as Ginseng, Passion Flower, 
Hippophae and coffee – have been 
a full part of medical practice in 
various cultures for centuries. The 
effectiveness of these neuro-enhan-
cing herbs in improving concentration 
and alertness was confirmed from a 
scientific perspective many years ago, 
and they have come to be collectively 
known as “adaptogens” (Brekhman 
and Dardymov 1969). 
Adaptogens are both socially and 
ethically accepted across the 
globe, despite the fact that many 
of them, when misused, can have 
severe and harmful side effects. 
With the emergence of modern 
science, we   are  able to isolate 
and purify natural substances – and 
synthesize new substances with 
neuro-enhancing properties. Stimula-
tory compounds that modulate 
perception, mood, consciousness, 
alertness and behavior include 
substances such as cocaine and 
amphetamines. Cocaine was first 
isolated in 1855 from the leaves of 
the coca plant and had become a 
frequently used stimulant in some 
countries, including the United 
States, by the beginning of the 20th 
century. For instance, it was used in 
the formulation of the early version 
of Coca-Cola. Amphetamines were 
chemically synthesized in 1927 and 
were initially used to treat asthma. 
Their stimulatory effect was soon 
noticed, and their use ranged from 
diet pills to anti-fatigue drugs, popular 
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in treating narcolepsy and in lengthe-
ning the attention span of soldiers 
during World War II. 
In the late 1960s, the potential 
for the abuse of amphetamines 
and cocaine was recognized, which 
fostered further research that aimed 
to replace both substances and that 
led to the development of the first 
generation of synthetic psychotropics, 
including neuroepileptics, antidepres-
sants and anxiolytics. However, those 
psychotropics were soon abandoned 
due to their unpleasant side effects, 
and were replaced by second-gene-
ration drugs known as “smart drugs” 
or “nootropics” – from the Greek 
words noos (mind) and trepein (turn, 
change) (Giurgea 1972). Nootropics 
are a class of psychotropic drugs that 
affect learning ability, concentra-
tion and memory. They protect the 
brain from injuries (both physical and 
chemical) and have no sedative or 
toxic effects. The first nootropic drug, 
Piracetam, was synthesized in 1964 
by Dr. Cornelius E. Giurgea with the 
intention of enhancing brain function 
(Giurgea 1982). By advocating that:
“Man is not going to wait passively 
for millions of years before evo-
lution offers him a better brain”, 
Giurgea paved the way for 
the development and increasing 
acceptance of neuro-enhancing drugs 
(Rose 2006). 
Although “stimulants” are 
the most well-known nootropics, 
broad spectrums of substances 
are classified under the same 
term. This classification current-
ly includes metabolic agents (e.g., 
creatine, carnitine), herbs and plant 
extracts (e.g., Bacopa Monnieri, St. 
John’s Wort), dopaminergics (e.g., 
Modafinil, Ritalin, Adderall), nutrients 
(e.g., choline, creatine), eugeroics 
(e.g., Modafinil, Adrafinil, Nuvigil) 
and racetams  (Garnock-Jones and 
Keating 2009; Sulzer 2005). Despite 
their usefulness in treating disorders 
such as narcolepsy, Alzheimer’s and 
Parkinson’s diseases, in addition 
to attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), the mode of action 
of many nootropics remains elusive 
(Mondadori 1994; Mondadori 1993).
Substances such as the 
narcolepsy drug Modafinil (Provigil®) 
– also called “Brain Viagra” – were 
so effective that they became popular 
within certain work communities (for 
instance, night-shift workers and 
students) (McCabe 2005; Gerrard and 
Malcolm 2007). Even Hollywood has 
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recognized their “usefulness” and 
expanded the possible scenarios of 
“future generation” drugs. Built on 
the urban myth that we commonly 
use only a small portion of our brain 
capacity, films such as Limitless 
(2011) or more recently Lucy (2014) 
have taken the possible effects of 
magic pills to an entirely new level. 
Both movies portray neuroenhan-
cement as alluring, creating “super 
humans” with outstanding cognitive 
abilities. 
However, these movies also raise 
important socio-ethical issues, 
including the abuse of power in 
Limitless and the fear of losing 
what makes us human in Lucy.
Brain stimulation technology 
Neuroenhancement strategies 
are not limited to “magic pills”. 
Cutting-edge technology also in-
cludes both invasive and non-in-
vasive brain-controlled ma-
chines. 
Until recently, the actual 
implementation of these technolo-
gies was considered too futuristic 
and/or beyond the scope of realistic 
deliberations into their possible 
applications. However, in the movie 
Transcendence (2014), Hollywood has 
recently picked up on scenarios that 
might arguably be possible, challen-
ging our perception of where human 
beings end and machines begin.
The significance of this field, 
which aims at understanding the 
neural connectivity of the brain, is also 
highlighted in the array of consortiums 
and projects on the topic launched in 
recent years. Between 2012 and 2014, 
the Human Connectome Project, 
the Human Brain Project and the 
BRAIN initiative were launched. The 
objective of the first project is to 
provide a network map of the normal 
brain. The second project uses 
computer simulations to increase 
our understanding of brain function. 
Building on previous knowledge, 
the third and newest project aims at 
“accelerating the development and 
application of innovative technolo-
gies” related to the brain (Bargmann 
and Nesome 2014).
The non-invasive technologies 
used today are represented by 
“trans-cranial magnetic stimu-
lation” and “trans-cranial direct 
current stimulation”. 
They consist essentially of 
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non-invasive techniques (electro-
des on the scalp) that transmit 
small magnetic fields and electrical 
currents to specific regions of the 
brain to increase or decrease neuronal 
activity in the stimulated area. These 
techniques are used to treat psychia-
tric disorders, depression, post-trau-
matic stress disorder or schizophre-
nia, Parkinson’s disease, and epilepsy 
(Rossi 2009). In addition to their 
therapeutic use, they have been 
shown to enhance cognition, selective 
attention (Gladwin, den Uyl, and Wiers 
2012) and working memory (Fregni 
2005). Other techniques, including 
“deep brain stimulation” and “neural 
prosthetics”, involve technological 
implants inserted into the brain and are 
therefore more invasive. Deep brain 
stimulation requires the implanta-
tion of an electronic device into the 
brain in combination with medication 
to provide curative or palliative 
solutions to severe disorders, such 
as obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
Tourette syndrome, Alzheimer’s or 
Parkinson’s diseases (Rabins et al. 
2009). The most promising methods 
may be the so-called “brain-machine 
interfaces” (BMI), which typically do 
not require deep surgical implantation 
into the brain. BMIs are based on brain 
activity recording techniques, such 
as electroencephalography (EEG) 
and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). These interfaces 
are mainly used for brain-computer 
communication and, to date, have 
come to play an important role in 
neurological rehabilitation (Dalv and 
Wolpaw 2008).
One of the most mature – and 
largely known – brain stimulation 
technologies is the Cochlear implant, 
which transforms sound waves into 
electronic signals and stimulates the 
auditory nerve to transfer information 
into the brain. Various artificial retinas 
have also been developed. Typical-
ly, these are connected to a small 
external computer (an “exocortex”) 
that processes the electronic informa-
tion captured by the artificial retina 
and sends it to the visual cortex of the 
brain for detection. Further applica-
tions of the technology involve neural 
implants that relay voluntary motor 
signals to prosthetics or computers 
to correct movement disorders 
(Collinger 2013; Yanagisawa 2011). 
During the last decade, the 
production of safer and more efficient 
brain implants, improved surgical 
procedures that render the insertion 
of deep brain stimulation devices 
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reversible, and a number of success-
ful therapeutic trials have fostered 
the potential to apply this type of 
technology, for example, to memory 
enhancement (Bell, Mathieu, and 
Racine 2009). Much like the “magic 
pills” are becoming the norm in 
certain communities, we anticipate 
similar success for these brain-sti-
mulating technologies. 
Genetic engineering
The interest in neuroenhan-
cement through the use of “magic 
pills” or brain-machine interfaces 
is growing significantly. Neverthe-
less, as the pharmacological and 
technological interventions described 
above imply, these strategies have 
been developed to alter somatic 
and phenotypic traits, as opposed to 
germinal and genotypic traits. For 
this reason, they can typically only 
temporarily fix an abnormality, and 
frequent repetition of the treatment 
is often required. In other words, the 
neuroenhancement that is achieved 
by these means is not permanent 
over the long term and cannot be 
transmitted genetically to offspring.
When a permanent – and 
trans-heritable – neuroenhance-
ment is intended, genetic enginee-
ring technology is necessary, at 
least for now and according to our 
best knowledge. The most recent 
decades of biological research have 
generated a large amount of informa-
tion on the human genome that may 
indeed be of interest in developing 
more permanent neuroenhancement 
strategies in the future. 
The growing knowledge about the 
genes involved in human cogni-
tion has led to novel treatments 
to restore neurological func-
tions to be tested in humans. 
For instance, one of the first 
successful (2011) gene therapy trials 
in neurobiology was the treatment 
and cure of choroideremia, which 
causes successive blindness in 
males from childhood to middle 
age (Benjaminy, Macdonald, and 
Bubela 2014). Moreover, the human 
gene named rbAp48 was recently 
found to be involved in age-related 
memory loss (Pavlopoulos 2013). 
Notably, when this gene was knocked 
out in mice, the animals exhibited 
short-term memory loss, failing both 
novel object recognition tests and 
various maze experiments. When 
the gene was reintroduced, the mice 
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could remember new objects better 
and find their way out of the mazes. 
Such genes are foreseen as future 
candidates for restoring or enhancing 
cognitive functions. 
As a complement to genetic 
research, epigenetics – the study of 
how the environment influences the 
expression of our genetic background 
without inducing any changes in 
the DNA sequence – has also been 
shown to play a key role in neurolo-
gical processes and behaviors. It has 
been observed that maternal interac-
tion with offspring in rats might alter 
the expression of a specific gene in 
the offspring by modulating DNA 
methylation – a chemical reaction that 
occurs in DNA strands (Weaver 2004). 
Different levels of methylation in this 
specific gene were found to influence 
the animals’ stress response in 
adulthood. Similar studies in humans 
have also revealed associations 
between early-life conditions (such 
as stress and social adversity) and 
the epigenetic programming of 
gene expression by DNA-reversible 
modifications that affect psycholo-
gical health in adulthood (McGowan 
and Szyf 2010). 
These findings indicate that, by 
modifying the living conditions 
during embryogenesis, fetal de-
velopment and early life – or by 
reversing the “epigenetic pro-
gramming” that occurs through 
DNA-reversible modifications – we 
might have found novel oppor-
tunities to optimize one’s future 
health. 
Despite the documented efficien-
cy of the abovementioned trials in 
treating rare neurological disorders, 
genetic and epigenetic engineering 
in humans remains in its infancy. 
However, the increasing knowledge 
regarding our genome, in combina-
tion with the array of novel genome 
editing techniques, offers hope for the 
development of strategies that may 
possibly reverse detrimental innate 
genetic traits or acquired epigenetic 
variations programmed by adverse 
early-life conditions. Given that these 
technologies appear to be effective 
for therapeutic purposes, they also 
hold great potential for enhancing 
cognitive abilities in the future. 
Socio-ethical issues
With these advancements in 
neurobiology and the potential for 
neuroenhancement they entail, 
certain ethical and social issues are 
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emerging. The first issue involves 
medical safety. It is commonly 
acknowledged that the clinical risks 
– unwanted side effects or unantici-
pated future outcomes to patients 
and research participants – must be 
minimized. The great complexity of 
the brain makes such interventions 
very sensitive. Before we implant 
an electronic device into someone’s 
brain, for instance, there should be no 
other alternative remaining, and the 
expected benefits should be signifi-
cant and highly likely. 
However a risk-benefit analysis 
that is grounded only in a clinical and 
therapeutic mindset may be insuffi-
cient in addressing : 
« the larger societal risks that we 
face with the appearance of a di-
versity of novel neuroenhance-
ment opportunities in our lives. » 
For instance, lowering the 
clinical risks of psycho-stimu-
lants by developing smart drugs 
with only minimal side effects may 
simultaneously lower the threshold 
of benefits that are required for their 
acceptable implementation. Hence, 
the minimization of their clinical 
risks may lead to the trivializa-
tion of their use, which may lead to 
larger consequences for society, as 
we discuss below. For this reason, 
it is important to the subsequent 
regulation of their use to consider 
how these technologies can impact 
not only the health of individuals but 
also human life and the common good 
more generally.
For instance, privacy and confi-
dentiality issues are emerging and 
should also be addressed. 
With the increasing number and 
performance of instruments related 
to brain imaging technologies (e.g., 
EEG, fMRI), there is a growing risk 
that: 
« the protection of one’s private 
life and personal information 
will be challenged. »
For example, mind reading 
devices and research that aims to 
read intentions or the thoughts of 
criminals is steadily gaining interest 
in the justice system as a supplemen-
tary tool to assess one’s liability in a 
crime. 
Similarly, military uses of 
mind-reading technology (for 
instance, taking information from 
someone without his consent for 
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reasons of national security) mi-
ght also represent a potential 
threat to privacy and confidentia-
lity. 
Further tangible future applica-
tions include adapting advertise-
ments to consumers’ preferences 
after reading their minds and gaining 
access to and taking advantage of 
health data and intimate thoughts. 
With the development of “mind 
transferring” technologies – in which 
“individual knowledge” can be stored 
in computers – strong concerns 
related to the storage, processing 
and manipulation of such “sensitive” 
information are being voiced. 
For instance, should employers or 
insurance companies have access 
to this information? Moreover, 
might such access lead to discri-
mination in social security or em-
ployment?
Additionally, issues related to in-
dividual autonomy and social jus-
tice might also arise. 
With the increasing use of 
nootropics to boost learning and 
memory capacity, we might enter 
into a “competition game” in which 
students and workers are asked to 
handle significantly more tasks based 
on their increased productivity and 
efficiency. Forecasting the future of 
previously existing trends, we may 
wonder whether the use of cognitive 
enhancers will remain a free choice. 
« Indeed, there might be increasing 
pressure to take these drugs to 
perform. »
 
 This may affect the free and 
voluntary decision-making process 
that should guide these actions. 
Further, if an increasing number 
of people use these drugs to boost 
their academic performance, we 
may wonder whether it is fair for the 
individuals who do not. If not everyone 
has access to cognitive enhancers, 
disparities in performance according 
to social status will likely be created 
and reinforced, further increasing the 
social gap between the rich and the 
poor. Hence, we might discuss the 
fairness of only certain people having 
the ability to enhance their human 
capacities, whereas others might not 
even have enough resources to reach 
their “normal” unenhanced human 
potential. 
Further macroscopic economic 
issues are also at stake. Indeed, given 
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that the healthcare system is already 
cracking under the insurmountable 
costs of therapeutic health services:
« is it reasonable to invest so much 
in developing neuro-technologies 
and to cover their non-therapeu-
tic use with public funds when we 
– as a society – might not be able to 
afford it? 
In fact, doing so would lead not 
only to an undesirable extra financial 
burden on society but also (arguably) 
to another burden on the environ-
ment, given that the creation of these 
technologies requires substantial 
extra energy and materials, which 
are both limited resources. Inversely, 
the contemporary imperatives of a 
growing economy might be used as a 
rhetorical justification for increasing 
the required amount of producti-
vity from individuals (e.g., workers, 
students) by elevating their cognitive 
potential. However, such a race 
for competition and productivity is 
endless. Is this how we want to live? We 
must be aware of both the economic 
constraints and the pressures of the 
economic model we have chosen if we 
aim for the ethical implementation of 
neuro-enhancers in our society.
With the mapping of the human 
brain and its connection to machines, 
we might increasingly perceive 
ourselves in mechanistic terms 
as being highly determined by our 
body, which these technologies can 
always “upgrade”. Following such a 
perspective, according to which all 
human behaviors may be explained 
by neurotransmitters and localized 
brain activity, which in turn might be 
subject to modulation to “improve” 
behavior, we might wonder whether 
concepts such as merit, motivation, 
courage and, above all, free will will 
continue to have the same value. In 
this context, what place would remain 
for individual choice and how might it 
modify the lived human experience?
 
Moreover, increasingly perceiving 
ourselves as mere biologically 
determined ‘automated machines’ 
– i.e., not influenced by God 
or any external spirit – we may well 
reconsider what place religion and 
more generally spirituality will hold in 
our societies. 
In sum, critical questions 
emerge. 
Do we want privacy and confiden-
tiality to remain important values 
in the future? 
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Can we accept that our lives 
might be ruled by the pressure of 
an endlessly growing economy that 
keeps asking for more and more from 
each individual? How do we anticipate 
or expect to change? Will it be a bodily 
or a spiritual change? Will we remain 
‘free creatures’? Adopting a precautio-
nary approach to the implementation 
of neuroenhancement technology and 
finding answers to such questions is 
essential to appropriately prepare for 
its effect on our human and cultural 
identity and on what we think of and 
how we interact with other people. 
References
Bargmann, Cornelia I. and William T. Nesome. 
2014. “The Brain Research through Advancing 
Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative 
and Neurology.” JAMA Neurology 71 (6): 675-6.
Bell, Emily, Ghislaine Mathieu, and Eric Racine. 
2009. “Preparing the Ethical Future of Deep Brain 
Stimulation.” Surgical Neurology 72 (6): 577-86 
[Discussion:586].
Benjaminy, Shelly, Ian Macdonald, and Tania 
Bubela. 2014. “«Is a cure in my sight?» 
Multi-Stakeholder Perspectives on Phase I 
choroideremia Gene Transfer Clinical Trials.” 
Genetics in Medicine : Official Journal of the 
American College of Medical Genetics 16 (5): 
379-85.
Bostrom, Nick. 2005. “In Defense of Posthuman 
Dignity.” Bioethics 19 (3): 202-14.
Brekhman, I.I. and I.V. Dardymov. 1969. “New 
Substances of Plant Origin Which Increase 
Nonspecific Resistance.” Annual Review of 
Pharmacology 9 (1): 419-30.
Collinger, Jennifer L., Brian Wodlinger, John 
E. Downey, Wei Wang, Elizabeth C. Tyler-Kaba-
ra, Douglas J. Weber, Angus J.  C. McMorland, 
Meel Velliste, Michael L. Boninger, and 
Andrew B. Schwartz. 2013. “High-Performance 
Neuroprosthetic Control by an Individual with 
Tetraplegia.” Lancet 381 (9866): 557-64.
Daly, Janis J. and Jonathan R. Wolpaw. 2008. 
“Brain-Computer Interfaces in Neurological 
Rehabilitation.” Lancet Neurology 7 (11): 1032-43.
Fregni, , Paulo S. Boggio, Michael Nitsche, Felix 
Bermpohl, Andrea Antal, Eva Feredoes, Marco A. 
Marcolin, Sergio P. Rigonatti, Maria T.  A. Silva, 
Walter Paulus, and Alvaro Pascual-Leone. 2005. 
“Anodal Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
of Prefrontal Cortex Enhances Working Memory.” 
Experimental Brain Research 166 (1): 23-30.
Garnock-Jones, Karly P. and Gillian M. Keating. 
2009. “Atomoxetine: A Review of Its Use in 
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in 
Children and Adolescents.” Paediatric Drugs 
11(3): 203-26.
Gerrard, Paul and Robert Malcolm. 2007. 
“Mechanisms of modafinil: A Review of Current 
Research.” Neuropsychiatric Disease & 
Treatment 3 (3): 349-64. 
Giurgea, Corneliu E. 1972. “[Pharmacology 
of integrative activity of the brain. Attempt at 
nootropic concept in psychopharmacology].”Ac-
tualites Pharmacologiques 25: 115-56.
Giurgea, Corneliu E. 1982. “The Nootropic 
Concept and Its Prospective Implications.” Drug 
Development Research 2 (5): 441–6.
Gladwin, Thomas E., Tess E. den Uyl, and Reinout 
W. Wiers. 2012. “Anodal tDCS of Dorsolateral 
Prefontal Cortex during an Implicit Association 
Test.” Neuroscience Letters 517 (2): 82-6.
McCabe, Sean Esteban, John R. Knight, Christian 
J. Teter, and Henry Wechsler. 2005. “Non-Medi-
102
cal Use of Prescription Stimulants among US 
College Students: Prevalence and Correlates 
from a National Survey.” Addiction 100 (1): 96-106.
McGowan, Patrick O. and Moshe Szyf. 2010. 
“The Epigenetics of Social Adversity in Early 
Life: Implications for Mental Health Outcomes.” 
Neurobiology of Disease 39 (1): 66-72.
Mondadori, Cesare. 1993. “The Pharmacolo-
gy of the Nootropics; New Insights and New 
Questions.” Behavioural Brain Research 59 (1-2): 
1-9.
Mondadori, Cesare. 1994. “In Search of the 
Mechanism of Action of the Nootropics: New 
Insights and Potential Clinical Implications.” Life 
Sciences 55 (25-26): 2171-8. 
Pavlopoulos, Elias, Sidonie Jones, Stylianos 
Kosmidis, Maggie Close, Carla Kim, Olga 
Kovalerchik, Scott A. Small, and Eric R. Kandel. 
2013. “Molecular Mechanism for Age-Related 
Memory Loss: the Histone-Binding Protein 
RbAp48.” Science Translational Medicine 5 (200): 
200ra115.
Rabins, Peter, Brian S. Appleby, Jason Brandt, 
Mahlon R. DeLong, Laura B. Dunn, Loes 
Gabriëls, Benjamin D. Greenberg, Suzanne N. 
Haber, Paul E. Holtzheimer, Zoltan Mari, Helen 
S. Mayberg, Evelyn McCann, Sallie P. Mink, 
Steven Rasmussen, Thomas E. Schlaepfer, 
Dorothy E. Vawter, Jerrold L. Vitek, John Walkup, 
and Debra J.  H. Mathews. 2009. “Scientific and 
Ethical Issues Related to Deep Brain Stimulation 
for Disorders of Mood, Behavior, and Thought.” 
Archives of General Psychiatry 66 (9): 931-7.
Rose, Steven. 2006. The Future of the Brain: the 
Promise and Perils of Tomorrow’s Neuroscience. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rossi, Simone, Mark Hallett, Paolo M. Rossini, 
Alvaro Pascual-Leone, and The Safety of TMS 
Consensus Group. 2009. “Safety, Ethical Conside-
rations, and Application Guidelines for the Use 
of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in Clinical 
Practice and Research.” Clinical Neurophysiolo-
gy 120 (12): 2008-39.
Sulzer, David, Mark S. Sonders, Nathan W. 
Poulsen, and Aurelio Galli. 2005. “Mechanisms of 
Neurotransmitter Release by Amphetamines: A 
Review.” Progress in Neurobiology 75 (6): 406-33.
Weaver, Ian CG., Nadia Cervoni, Frances A. 
Champagne, Ana C. D’Alessio, Shakti Sharma, 
Jonathan R. Seckl, Sergiy Dymov, Moshe Szyf, 
and Michael J. Meaney. 2004. “Epigenetic 
Programming by Maternal Behavior.” Nature 
Neuroscience 7 (8): 847-54.
Yanagisawa, Takufumi, Masayuki Hirata, Youichi 
Saitoh, Tetsu Goto, Haruhiko Kishima, Ryohei 
Fukuma, Hiroshi Yokoi, Yukiyasu Kamitani, and 
Toshiki Yoshimine. 2011. “Real-Time Control of 
a Prosthetic Hand Using Human electrocortico-
graphy Signals.” Journal of Neurosurgery 114 (6): 
1715-22.
103
About the autors
Chapter 1
In Search of the Elixir of Youth
Indrani Gupta
I am a Molecular Biologist by training, Operatio-
nal Strategist by choice and Thinker by soul. 
My ethnicity connects me to the core questions 
about humanity. I believe in a positive outcome 
to everything.
Kristina Kakalacheva
After growing up in Bulgaria, I ventured out to 
obtain my biosciences education abroad. My 
journey led me to the University of Zurich, where 
I completed my PhD studies in immunology. 
Currently, I am an associate at a venture capital 
firm and provide advice on investments in biotech 
companies that develop cancer therapeutics. 
Enrica Saponara
I am Enrica, an Italian Biotechnologist attending 
the 4th year of the PhD studies in Integrative 
Molecular Medicine at the UniversitätsSpi-
tal Zürich. During my PhD, I have been mainly 
studying the regenerative capability of exocrine 
pancreatic and the molecular mechanisms 
leading to pancreatic cancer initiation.
Chapter 2
Enhancing human enhancement : 
a legal perspective
David Shaw
is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for 
Biomedical Ethics at the University of Basel. He 
was previously Lecturer in Ethics in the School 
of Medicine of the University of Glasgow and 
Research Fellow in Ethics, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs at the University of St Andrews. He is 
interested in all areas of bioethics, but particu-
larly clinical and research ethics.
Chapter 3
Human enhancement and 
evolution
José Aguilar-Rodríguez
José Aguilar-Rodríguez is a PhD student on 
Evolutionary (Systems) Biology in the Institute of 
Evolutionary Biology and Environmental Sciences 
at the University of Zurich working in the laborato-
ry of Andreas Wagner. He is also affiliated with 
the Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics. His main 
research interests are the evolution of biologi-
cal systems and the fundamental organizational 
principles of life. He is a passionate reader of 
science fiction. 
Ali Rezaee Vahdati
Ali Rezaee Vahdati, a current PhD candidate at 
the laboratory of Andreas Wagner in Zurich, 
studies act of natural selection and genetic drift 
on allelic diversity using computer simulations. 
He has done his bachelor studies in Iran, and 
then a master at the University of Manchester.
 
Chapter 4
If doping is wrong, why do 
we love Popeye? Let’s topple 
talentocracy.
Pieter Bonte
Pieter Bonte is a philosopher who explores how 
humans are circular, self-shaping creatures. In 
2015, he will defend his PhD thesis “Freedom in 
the Flesh.” A further development of his critique 
of talent and defence of doping can be found in 
his TEDx talk with the same title of his contribu-
tion here.
104
Chapter 5 
Heracles or Icarus : 
Mythological References in the 
Human Enhancement Debate
Trijsje Franssen
Trijsje Franssen finished her PhD in Philosophy 
at the University of Exeter (UK), and currently 
works as an Assistant Professor in Philosophy 
of Science at the University of Amsterdam. Her 
research is on the role of myth and imagination in 
the enhancement debate, focusing in particular 
on moral claims and concepts of human nature.
Erik Malmqvist
Erik Malmqvist, Ph.D., is Lecturer in Philosophy of 
Medicine and Medical Ethics at the Department of 
Thematic Studies, Linköping University, Sweden. 
His research focuses on ethical issues in organ- 
and tissue transplantation, biomedical research, 
assisted reproduction and vaccination.
Chapter 6
Science and technology, 
towards enhancing the human 
condition
Xaroula Kerasidou
Dr. Xaroula Kerasidou is a Research Associate 
at the Centre for Mobilities Research, Lancaster 
University. Her research interests lie within the 
field of feminist science and technology studies 
where she focuses on the material and semiotic 
practices of technoscience. Currently, she works 
on the EU FP7 funded project SecInCoRe (www.
secincore.eu) which explores the social, legal 
and ethical implications of technology.  
Laura Cabrera
Dr. Cabrera is Assistant Professor of Neuroethics 
at the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the 
Life Sciences. Her research focuses on the 
exploration of attitudes, perceptions and values 
of the general public toward neurotechnologies, 
as well as the normative implications of using 
neurotechnologies for non-medical purposes.
Olivette R. Burton
Olivette R. Burton MSW, MBe is an American 
social scientist and bioethicist.  Her expertise 
is in socio-cultural and ethical policy making 
considerations particularly as it relates to the 
development, education and implementation of 
science and technology.  She holds advanced 
degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. 
She lectures around the world and has appeared 
on radio, international documentaries and news 
outlets on tolerance and social responsibility. 
She also is the CEO of Sweetnation.org which is 
a humanitarian company focusing on the needs 
of marginalized and disenfranchised populations. 
She resides in New York City.
Chapter 7
Playing with the “Playing God” 
Elena Andreeva
Elena Andreeva is a fourth year PhD student at 
the Institute of Neuroinformatics, ETH Zurich. 
Her research focuses on the neural basis of 
selective attention. She discovered faith during 
her undergraduate years at the University of 
Oxford, and remains a practicing Christian.
Hossein Dabbagh
Hossein Dabbagh spent his doctoral journey 
in moral philosophy at Reading and Oxford 
Universities. He received his MA in Western and 
Islamic philosophy from National University, Iran. 
He is a former research fellow at Oxford Centre 
for Socio-Legal Studies and now is a visiting 
scholar at Institute of Social Ethics, University 
of Lucerne, Switzerland. He is also assistant 
professor at Department of Philosophy, Doha 
Institute for Graduate Studies. He was a co-foun-
der of Democrat Islamic Student Association in 
University of Tehran and is a member of Institute 
for Epistemological Research, a leading institute 
for the religious intellectualism project in Iran.
105
Chapter 8
Be the best version of yourself: 
How individual enhancements 
can cause social change
Cynthia Forlini
Dr Cynthia Forlini is an ARC DECRA Research 
Fellow at the University of Queensland Centre 
for Clinical Research. Her research explores the 
neuroethics issues in defining the boundaries 
between enhancement and maintenance of 
cognitive performance across the lifespan.
Tugce Bilgin
Dr Tugce Bilgin Sonay studied Genetics and 
Bioengineering (B.Sc) in Istanbul and Life 
Sciences (M.A.) in University of Zurich, where 
she obtained her PhD degree in evolutionary 
biology. She then received the Forschungskre-
dit post-doctoral fellowship to work on human 
evolution in the Anthrolopology Department of 
University of Zurich.
Chapter 9
Crossing mind barriers A 
precautionary approach to 
neuroenhancement strategies
Charles Dupras
Charles Dupras, is pursuing a PhD in bioethics 
at the University of Montreal, about the ethical, 
social and political implications of recent discove-
ries in the field of epigenetics, and is interested 
in ethical inquiries addressing human enhance-
ment through various forms of biotechnologies.
Nakita Frater
Nakita Frater, undertaking a PhD in the field of 
Evolutionary Biology/Anthropology, interested 
in the evolutionary past, present and future of 
humankind. 
Despoina Goniotaki
Despoina Goniotaki, currently pursuing a PhD in 
the field of Neuroscience, with a never-ending 
interest in understanding the mind.
Linda Jäger
Linda Jäger, a native of Stockholm, Sweden is 
pursuing a PhD in the field of protein enginee-
ring and enjoys studying evolution in a petri dish, 
while envisaging its vast implication to the world 
as a whole.
106
Recent technological progresses have 
made technological modifications 
of human beings a real possibility. 
Many “normal traits” may be 
artificially enhanced. Sooner or latter, 
individuals will have the possibility 
to exchange their healthy limbs and 
organs for better artificial ones and 
transplantations of human brains into 
artificial carriers are already under 
study. Therefore, socio-ethical issues 
related to human enhancement have 
started to be seriously considered 
by scholars around the world. 
While such a technological kind 
of revolution concerns the society 
as a whole, debates addressing 
the socio-ethical issues related to 
human enhancement have mainly 
been restricted to academics. Lay 
people are largely unaware of the 
discussions. That is the objective of 
this book to inform lay people of the 
already existing and potential future 
possibilities to enhance humans 
through emerging technologies 
as well as the socio-ethical issues 
that are already raised by such 
technological modifications. 
This book constitutes a first step 
to encourage democratic and 
interdisciplinary involvement and 
discussion about some of the 
socio-ethical issues related to the 
technological modifications of human 
beings. 
